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- Title: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
- Author: David Hume
- L. A. Selby-Bigge
- Posting Date: November 15, 2011 [EBook #9662]
- Release Date: January, 2006
- First Posted: October 14, 2003
- Language: English
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- AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.
- BY DAVID HUME
- Extracted from:
- Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding, and Concerning the
- Principles of Morals, By David Hume.
- Reprinted from The Posthumous Edition of 1777, and Edited with
- Introduction, Comparative Tables of Contents, and Analytical Index
- by L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A., Late Fellow of University College, Oxford.
- Second Edition, 1902
- CONTENTS
- I. Of the different Species of Philosophy
- II. Of the Origin of Ideas
- III. Of the Association of Ideas
- IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding
- V. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts
- VI. Of Probability
- VII. Of the Idea of necessary Connexion
- VIII. Of Liberty and Necessity
- IX. Of the Reason of Animals
- X. Of Miracles
- XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future State
- XII. Of the academical or sceptical Philosophy
- INDEX
- SECTION I.
- OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY.
- 1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated
- after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and
- may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of
- mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as
- influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object,
- and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to
- possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As
- virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species
- of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all
- helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy
- and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the
- imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking
- observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters
- in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the
- views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the
- soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us _feel_ the
- difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our
- sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity
- and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of
- all their labours.
- 2. The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a
- reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his
- understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature
- as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in
- order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite
- our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object,
- action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that
- philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation
- of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth
- and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able
- to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this
- arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from
- particular instances to general principles, they still push on their
- enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they
- arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all
- human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem
- abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the
- approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves
- sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they
- can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction
- of posterity.
- 3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with
- the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and
- abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable,
- but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds
- the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which
- actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model
- of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse
- philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into
- business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and
- comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence
- over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation
- of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its
- conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.
- 4. This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as
- justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that
- abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary
- reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not
- been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is
- easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile
- reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he
- pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any
- conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular
- opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common
- sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by
- accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal
- to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into
- the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The
- fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle is utterly
- decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation:
- But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his
- own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke
- shall be entirely forgotten.
- The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little
- acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either
- to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from
- communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions
- equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere
- ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of
- an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish,
- than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble
- entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between
- those extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, company,
- and business; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy
- which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and
- accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to
- diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be more
- useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which draw not
- too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be
- comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble
- sentiments and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human
- life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science
- agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining.
- Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper
- food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human
- understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this
- particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man
- is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he
- always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper
- relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition,
- as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to
- business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and
- cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then,
- that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the
- human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses
- to _draw_ too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and
- entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your
- science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and
- society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will
- severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the
- endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception
- which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be
- a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.
- 5. Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy
- philosophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or
- contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply
- with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without
- opposition, his own taste and sentiment. But as the matter is often
- carried farther, even to the absolute rejecting of all profound
- reasonings, or what is commonly called _metaphysics_, we shall now
- proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf.
- We may begin with observing, that one considerable advantage, which
- results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency
- to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a
- sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or
- reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in
- various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different
- sentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the
- qualities of the object, which they set before us. An artist must be
- better qualified to succeed in this undertaking, who, besides a delicate
- taste and a quick apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the
- internal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the workings of
- the passions, and the various species of sentiment which discriminate
- vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may
- appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would
- describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and
- manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and
- disagreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in
- delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the
- richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and
- engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure
- of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones,
- and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every
- case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment.
- In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.
- Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even those which
- most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however
- acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them
- more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher
- may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully
- cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the
- whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and
- calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility, in
- the subdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer
- principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his
- discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability
- of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern
- philosophy, have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar
- gradations.
- 6. Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the
- gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be
- despised; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless
- pleasures, which are bestowed on human race. The sweetest and most
- inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and
- learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or
- open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to
- mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing,
- it is with some minds as with some bodies, which being endowed with
- vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure
- from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and
- laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the
- eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs
- be delightful and rejoicing.
- But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected
- to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of
- uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible
- objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not
- properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human
- vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the
- understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being
- unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling
- brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chaced from the open
- country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in
- upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious
- fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a
- moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the
- gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and
- submission, as their legal sovereigns.
- 7. But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from
- such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her
- retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive
- the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the
- enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will
- at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of
- human reason. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an
- interest in perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the
- motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences;
- since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is
- still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved
- sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to
- former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous
- prize, and find himself stimulated, rather that discouraged, by the
- failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving
- so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of
- freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire
- seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an
- exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted
- for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue,
- in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics
- with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence,
- which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful
- philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair,
- which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine
- hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic
- remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able
- to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which,
- being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner
- impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science
- and wisdom.
- 8. Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the
- most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many
- positive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the
- powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the
- operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet,
- whenever they become the object of reflexion, they seem involved in
- obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries,
- which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to
- remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in
- an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved
- by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of
- science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate
- them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to
- correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made
- the object of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and
- distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to
- external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when
- directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the
- difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we
- can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the
- distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to
- go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no
- means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be
- esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy.
- Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science is uncertain and
- chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely
- subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted,
- that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these
- powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the
- immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and
- consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on
- this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond the
- compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of
- this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the
- imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every
- human creature; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no
- less real and certain, though more difficult to be comprehended. Some
- instances, especially late ones, of success in these enquiries, may give
- us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of
- learning. And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to
- give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the position and order
- of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook those, who, with so
- much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so
- intimately concerned?
- 9. But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and
- encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches
- still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs
- and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations?
- Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the
- phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly
- bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest
- reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the
- revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been
- performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason
- to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental
- powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is
- probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on
- another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and
- universal: And how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will
- be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to
- determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day
- made even by those who philosophize the most negligently: And nothing
- can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough
- care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human
- understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if not, it may,
- however, be rejected with some confidence and security. This last
- conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor ought it to be embraced too
- rashly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this
- species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto
- been accustomed, when they considered the vast multitude and diversity
- of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for
- some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend.
- And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far, by their
- passion for some one general principle; it must, however, be confessed,
- that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles,
- into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The
- like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians:
- Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer
- time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these
- sciences still nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all
- pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate,
- and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy,
- that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles
- on mankind.
- 10. What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract,
- and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption of their
- falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto
- escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and
- easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think
- ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of
- pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of
- knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance.
- But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no
- recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this
- difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding
- of all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted
- to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto
- deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite
- the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling
- profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty! And still more
- happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the
- foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto
- served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity
- and error!
- SECTION II.
- OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
- 11. Every one will readily allow, that there is a considerable
- difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the
- pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he
- afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by
- his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of
- the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of
- the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they
- operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so
- lively a manner, that we could _almost_ say we feel or see it: But,
- except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can
- arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions
- altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however
- splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make
- the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is
- still inferior to the dullest sensation.
- We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other
- perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very
- different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell
- me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and
- form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that
- conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we
- reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful
- mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs
- are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original
- perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or
- metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them.
- 12. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into
- two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different
- degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly
- denominated _Thoughts_ or _Ideas_. The other species want a name in our
- language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite
- for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term
- or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them
- _Impressions_; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from
- the usual. By the term _impression_, then, I mean all our more lively
- perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire,
- or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the
- less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on
- any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.
- 13. Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of
- man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not
- even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form
- monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the
- imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and
- familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along
- which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant
- transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even
- beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed
- to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be
- conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what
- implies an absolute contradiction.
- But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall
- find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very
- narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to
- no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or
- diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When
- we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas,
- _gold_, and _mountain_, with which we were formerly acquainted. A
- virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can
- conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a
- horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of
- thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the
- mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or,
- to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more
- feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.
- 14. To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be
- sufficient. First, when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however
- compounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into
- such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment.
- Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this
- origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The
- idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being,
- arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and
- augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We
- may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall
- always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar
- impression. Those who would assert that this position is not universally
- true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of
- refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not
- derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would
- maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression, or lively perception,
- which corresponds to it.
- 15. Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is
- not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is
- as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form
- no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that
- sense in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his
- sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no
- difficulty in conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if the
- object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the
- organ. A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine. And
- though there are few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind,
- where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or
- passion that belongs to his species; yet we find the same observation to
- take place in a less degree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of
- inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive
- the heights of friendship and generosity. It is readily allowed, that
- other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception;
- because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only
- manner by which an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the
- actual feeling and sensation.
- 16. There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove
- that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of
- their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed,
- that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or
- those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from
- each other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of
- different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the
- same colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the
- rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual
- gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote
- from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you
- cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose,
- therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to
- have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one
- particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his
- fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour,
- except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from
- the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank,
- where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a
- greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in
- any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own
- imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea
- of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by
- his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can:
- and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in
- every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this
- instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and
- does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.
- 17. Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself,
- simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might
- render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon,
- which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn
- disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally
- faint and obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of them: they are apt
- to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often
- employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to
- imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all
- impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are
- strong and vivid: the limits between them are more exactly determined:
- nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them.
- When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is
- employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need
- but enquire, _from what impression is that supposed idea derived_? And
- if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our
- suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably
- hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and
- reality.[1]
- [1] It is probable that no more was meant by those, who denied
- innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our
- impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which
- they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so
- exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their
- doctrine. For what is meant by _innate_? If innate be
- equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of
- the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever
- sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is
- uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant,
- contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous;
- nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins,
- whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word _idea_,
- seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by LOCKE and
- others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations
- and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should
- desire to know, what can be meant by asserting, that self-love,
- or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is
- not innate?
- But admitting these terms, _impressions_ and _ideas_, in the
- sense above explained, and understanding by _innate_, what is
- original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we
- assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas
- not innate.
- To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that LOCKE was
- betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who, making use
- of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious
- length, without ever touching the point in question. A like
- ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that
- philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other
- subjects.
- SECTION III.
- OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.
- 18. It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the
- different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance
- to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain
- degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or
- discourse this is so observable that any particular thought, which
- breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately
- remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering
- reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the
- imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a
- connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other.
- Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would
- immediately be observed something which connected it in all its
- transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread
- of discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in
- his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the
- subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot
- suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the
- words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly
- correspond to each other: a certain proof that the simple ideas,
- comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal
- principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.
- 19. Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas
- are connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted
- to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject,
- however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only
- three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, _Resemblance_,
- _Contiguity_ in time or place, and _Cause or Effect_.
- That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be
- much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original[2]:
- the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an
- enquiry or discourse concerning the others[3]: and if we think of a
- wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows
- it[4]. But that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no
- other principles of association except these, may be difficult to prove
- to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction.
- All we can do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and
- examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to
- each other, never stopping till we render the principle as general as
- possible[5]. The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ,
- the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form
- from the whole, is complete and entire.
- [2] Resemblance.
- [3] Contiguity.
- [4] Cause and effect.
- [5] For instance, Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion
- among Ideas: but it may, perhaps, be considered as a mixture of
- _Causation_ and _Resemblance_. Where two objects are contrary,
- the one destroys the other; that is, the cause of its
- annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object,
- implies the idea of its former existence.
- SECTION IV.
- SCEPTICAL DOUBTS CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.
- PART I.
- 20. All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided
- into two kinds, to wit, _Relations of Ideas_, and _Matters of Fact_. Of
- the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic;
- and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or
- demonstratively certain. _That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to
- the square of the two sides_, is a proposition which expresses a
- relation between these figures. _That three times five is equal to the
- half of thirty_, expresses a relation between these numbers.
- Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of
- thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the
- universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the
- truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty
- and evidence.
- 21. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are
- not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth,
- however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of
- every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a
- contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and
- distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. _That the sun will
- not rise to-morrow_ is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies
- no more contradiction than the affirmation, _that it will rise_. We
- should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it
- demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never
- be distinctly conceived by the mind.
- It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is
- the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and
- matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the
- records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has
- been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore
- our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry,
- may be the more excusable; while we march through such difficult paths
- without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting
- curiosity, and destroying that implicit faith and security, which is the
- bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the
- common philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a
- discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt
- something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to
- the public.
- 22. All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the
- relation of _Cause and Effect_. By means of that relation alone we can
- go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a
- man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance,
- that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a
- reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received
- from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man
- finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude
- that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings
- concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly
- supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that
- which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the
- inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate
- voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of
- some person: Why? because these are the effects of the human make and
- fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other
- reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on the
- relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or
- remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of
- fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other.
- 23. If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of
- that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how
- we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.
- I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no
- exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance,
- attained by reasonings _a priori_; but arises entirely from experience,
- when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with
- each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong
- natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he
- will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible
- qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his
- rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect,
- could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that
- it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it
- would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which
- appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the
- effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by
- experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and
- matter of fact.
- 24. This proposition, _that causes and effects are discoverable, not by
- reason but by experience_, will readily be admitted with regard to such
- objects, as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us;
- since we must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay
- under, of foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth
- pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he
- will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as
- to require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they
- make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure. Such events, as bear
- little analogy to the common course of nature, are also readily
- confessed to be known only by experience; nor does any man imagine that
- the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadstone, could ever
- be discovered by arguments _a priori_. In like manner, when an effect is
- supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of
- parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to
- experience. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why
- milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or
- a tiger?
- But the same truth may not appear, at first sight, to have the same
- evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from
- our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the
- whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple
- qualities of objects, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt
- to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of
- our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a
- sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one
- Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that
- we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with
- certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it
- is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even
- conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found
- in the highest degree.
- 25. But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the
- operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience,
- the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object
- presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the
- effect, which will result from it, without consulting past observation;
- after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this
- operation? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to
- the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be
- entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the
- supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the
- effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never
- be discovered in it. Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite
- distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the
- one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. A stone or piece of metal
- raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls:
- but to consider the matter _a priori_, is there anything we discover in
- this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an
- upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal? And as the first
- imagination or invention of a particular effect, in all natural
- operations, is arbitrary, where we consult not experience; so must we
- also esteem the supposed tie or connexion between the cause and effect,
- which binds them together, and renders it impossible that any other
- effect could result from the operation of that cause. When I see, for
- instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another;
- even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested
- to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive,
- that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause?
- May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball
- return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or
- direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why
- then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent
- or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings _a priori_ will never
- be able to show us any foundation for this preference.
- In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It
- could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first
- invention or conception of it, _a priori_, must be entirely arbitrary.
- And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause
- must appear equally arbitrary; since there are always many other
- effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In
- vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or
- infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and
- experience.
- 26. Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher, who is rational
- and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any
- natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which
- produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the
- utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of
- natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many
- particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings
- from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these
- general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we
- ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of
- them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from
- human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts,
- communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate
- causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may
- esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and
- reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to,
- these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural
- kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps the most
- perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to
- discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness
- and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every
- turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.
- 27. Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance of natural
- philosophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the
- knowledge of ultimate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for
- which it is so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics
- proceeds upon the supposition that certain laws are established by
- nature in her operations; and abstract reasonings are employed, either
- to assist experience in the discovery of these laws, or to determine
- their influence in particular instances, where it depends upon any
- precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion,
- discovered by experience, that the moment or force of any body in motion
- is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its
- velocity; and consequently, that a small force may remove the greatest
- obstacle or raise the greatest weight, if, by any contrivance or
- machinery, we can increase the velocity of that force, so as to make it
- an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry assists us in the application
- of this law, by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and
- figures which can enter into any species of machine; but still the
- discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience, and all the
- abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards
- the knowledge of it. When we reason _a priori_, and consider merely any
- object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all
- observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct
- object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and
- inviolable connexion between them. A man must be very sagacious who
- could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat, and ice
- of cold, without being previously acquainted with the operation of these
- qualities.
- PART II.
- 28. But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard
- to the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new
- question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther
- enquiries. When it is asked, _What is the nature of all our reasonings
- concerning matter of fact?_ the proper answer seems to be, that they are
- founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked,
- _What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning
- that relation?_ it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we
- still carry on our sifting humour, and ask, _What is the foundation of
- all conclusions from experience?_ this implies a new question, which may
- be of more difficult solution and explication. Philosophers, that give
- themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task
- when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them
- from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to
- bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this
- confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the
- difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may
- make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.
- I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall
- pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I
- say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause
- and effect, our conclusions from that experience are _not_ founded on
- reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must
- endeavour both to explain and to defend.
- 29. It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great
- distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of
- a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those
- powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely
- depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of
- bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those
- qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body.
- Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as
- to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for
- ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by
- communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant
- conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers[6] and
- principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that
- they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those
- which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like
- colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be
- presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and
- foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a
- process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the
- foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion
- between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently,
- that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their
- constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their
- nature. As to past _Experience_, it can be allowed to give _direct_ and
- _certain_ information of those precise objects only, and that precise
- period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience
- should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for
- aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main
- question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat,
- nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that
- time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow, that other
- bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible
- qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The
- consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged
- that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a
- certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants
- to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same, _I
- have found that such an object has always been attended with such an
- effect_, and _I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance,
- similar, will be attended with similar effects_. I shall allow, if you
- please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other:
- I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the
- inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that
- reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive.
- There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an
- inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that
- medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent
- on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the
- origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.
- [6] The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popular sense.
- The more accurate explication of it would give additional
- evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7.
- 30. This negative argument must certainly, in process of time, become
- altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers shall
- turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any
- connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the
- understanding in this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every
- reader may not trust so far to his own penetration, as to conclude,
- because an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not
- really exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more
- difficult task; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge,
- endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument.
- All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative
- reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning,
- or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no
- demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no
- contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object,
- seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with
- different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive
- that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects,
- resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there
- any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees
- will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now
- whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no
- contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative
- argument or abstract reasoning _Ã priori_.
- If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past
- experience, and make it the standard of our future judgement, these
- arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and
- real existence, according to the division above mentioned. But that
- there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of
- that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have
- said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation
- of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived
- entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions
- proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the
- past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by
- probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently
- going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point
- in question.
- 31. In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the
- similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are
- induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow
- from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever
- pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great
- guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so
- much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature,
- which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw
- advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different
- objects. From causes which appear _similar_ we expect similar effects.
- This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it seems
- evident that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as
- perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course
- of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs;
- yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same
- taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of
- uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and
- security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of
- reasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different
- from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise
- different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the
- sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I
- cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind
- still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.
- 32. Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we
- _infer_ a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret
- powers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in
- different terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument
- this _inference_ is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas,
- which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that
- the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear
- not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret powers of
- nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret
- powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without
- the aid of experience; contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers,
- and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here, then, is our natural state
- of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How
- is this remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform
- effects, resulting from certain objects, and teaches us that those
- particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such
- powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with similar sensible
- qualities, is produced, we expect similar powers and forces, and look
- for a like effect. From a body of like colour and consistence with bread
- we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or
- progress of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says, _I
- have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined
- with such secret powers_: And when he says, _Similar sensible qualities
- will always be conjoined with similar secret powers_, he is not guilty
- of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You
- say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you
- must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it
- demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experimental, is
- begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as
- their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that
- similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If
- there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that
- the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless,
- and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible,
- therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance
- of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the
- supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed
- hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or
- inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain
- do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past
- experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and
- influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities.
- This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not
- happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process
- of argument secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say,
- refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an
- agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has
- some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the
- foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able
- to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such
- importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public,
- even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We
- shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do
- not augment our knowledge.
- 33. I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who
- concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that
- therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all
- the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in
- fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to
- conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human
- comprehension. Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge,
- and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a
- suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not
- accurate. But with regard to the present subject, there are some
- considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or
- suspicion of mistake.
- It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants--nay infants,
- nay even brute beasts--improve by experience, and learn the qualities of
- natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a
- child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a
- candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will
- expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible
- qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the
- understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of
- argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that
- argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You
- cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your
- enquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere
- infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection,
- you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give
- up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us
- to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects
- from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition
- which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I
- pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must
- acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot
- now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me
- long before I was out of my cradle.
- SECTION V.
- SCEPTICAL SOLUTION OF THESE DOUBTS.
- PART I.
- 34. The passion for philosophy, like that for religion, seems liable to
- this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our
- manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent
- management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with
- more determined resolution, towards that side which already _draws_ too
- much, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain
- that, while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic
- sage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own
- minds, we may, at last, render our philosophy like that of Epictetus,
- and other _Stoics_, only a more refined system of selfishness, and
- reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment. While we
- study with attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts
- towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours, we are,
- perhaps, all the while flattering our natural indolence, which, hating
- the bustle of the world, and drudgery of business, seeks a pretence of
- reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence. There is,
- however, one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this
- inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion
- of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or
- propensity; and that is the Academic or Sceptical philosophy. The
- academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement, of danger in
- hasty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries
- of the understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which lie not
- within the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can
- be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the
- mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretensions, and its superstitious
- credulity. Every passion is mortified by it, except the love of truth;
- and that passion never is, nor can be, carried to too high a degree. It
- is surprising, therefore, that this philosophy, which, in almost every
- instance, must be harmless and innocent, should be the subject of so
- much groundless reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very
- circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to
- the public hatred and resentment. By flattering no irregular passion, it
- gains few partizans: By opposing so many vices and follies, it raises to
- itself abundance of enemies, who stigmatize it as libertine profane, and
- irreligious.
- Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavours to limit our
- enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common
- life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as
- speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the
- end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude,
- for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from
- experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by
- any argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger that
- these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be
- affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to
- make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal
- weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as
- long as human nature remains the same. What that principle is may well
- be worth the pains of enquiry.
- 35. Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of
- reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he
- would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects,
- and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover
- anything farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to
- reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by
- which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses;
- nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one
- instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the
- other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There
- may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of
- the other. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could
- never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact,
- or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his
- memory and senses.
- Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so
- long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be
- constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this
- experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the
- appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired
- any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object
- produces the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is
- engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to
- draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no
- part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course
- of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form
- such a conclusion.
- 36. This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of
- any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same
- act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of
- the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of
- _Custom_. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the
- ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of
- human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known
- by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, or pretend
- to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the
- ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from
- experience. It is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go so far,
- without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will
- carry us no farther. And it is certain we here advance a very
- intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert
- that, after the constant conjunction of two objects--heat and flame, for
- instance, weight and solidity--we are determined by custom alone to
- expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems
- even the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a
- thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one
- instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is
- incapable of any such variation. The conclusions which it draws from
- considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying
- all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one body
- move after being impelled by another, could infer that every other body
- will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience,
- therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning[7].
- [7] Nothing is more useful than for writers, even, on _moral_,
- _political_, or _physical_ subjects, to distinguish between
- _reason_ and _experience_, and to suppose, that these species
- of argumentation are entirely different from each other. The
- former are taken for the mere result of our intellectual
- faculties, which, by considering _Ã priori_ the nature of
- things, and examining the effects, that must follow from their
- operation, establish particular principles of science and
- philosophy. The latter are supposed to be derived entirely from
- sense and observation, by which we learn what has actually
- resulted from the operation of particular objects, and are
- thence able to infer, what will, for the future, result from
- them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and restraints of
- civil government, and a legal constitution, may be defended,
- either from _reason_, which reflecting on the great frailty and
- corruption of human nature, teaches, that no man can safely be
- trusted with unlimited authority; or from _experience_ and
- history, which inform us of the enormous abuses, that ambition,
- in every age and country, has been found to make of so
- imprudent a confidence.
- The same distinction between reason and experience is
- maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of
- life; while the experienced statesman, general, physician, or
- merchant is trusted and followed; and the unpractised novice,
- with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and despised.
- Though it be allowed, that reason may form very plausible
- conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a
- particular conduct in such particular circumstances; it is
- still supposed imperfect, without the assistance of experience,
- which is alone able to give stability and certainty to the
- maxims, derived from study and reflection.
- But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally
- received, both in the active speculative scenes of life, I
- shall not scruple to pronounce, that it is, at bottom,
- erroneous, at least, superficial.
- If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences
- above mentioned, are supposed to be the mere effects of
- reasoning and reflection, they will be found to terminate, at
- last, in some general principle or conclusion, for which we can
- assign no reason but observation and experience. The only
- difference between them and those maxims, which are vulgarly
- esteemed the result of pure experience, is, that the former
- cannot be established without some process of thought, and some
- reflection on what we have observed, in order to distinguish
- its circumstances, and trace its consequences: Whereas in the
- latter, the experienced event is exactly and fully familiar to
- that which we infer as the result of any particular situation.
- The history of a TIBERIUS or a NERO makes us dread a like
- tyranny, were our monarchs freed from the restraints of laws
- and senates: But the observation of any fraud or cruelty in
- private life is sufficient, with the aid of a little thought,
- to give us the same apprehension; while it serves as an
- instance of the general corruption of human nature, and shows
- us the danger which we must incur by reposing an entire
- confidence in mankind. In both cases, it is experience which is
- ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion.
- There is no man so young and unexperienced, as not to have
- formed, from observation, many general and just maxims
- concerning human affairs and the conduct of life; but it must
- be confessed, that, when a man comes to put these in practice,
- he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther
- experience both enlarge these maxims, and teach him their
- proper use and application. In every situation or incident,
- there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances,
- which the man of greatest talent is, at first, apt to overlook,
- though on them the justness of his conclusions, and
- consequently the prudence of his conduct, entirely depend. Not
- to mention, that, to a young beginner, the general observations
- and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions, nor can be
- immediately applied with due calmness and distinction. The
- truth is, an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at
- all, were he absolutely unexperienced; and when we assign that
- character to any one, we mean it only in a comparative sense,
- and suppose him possessed of experience, in a smaller and more
- imperfect degree.
- Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle
- alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect,
- for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared
- in the past.
- Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every
- matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and
- senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ
- our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an
- end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.
- 37. But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclusions
- from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of
- matters of fact which happened in the most distant places and most
- remote ages, yet some fact must always be present to the senses or
- memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A
- man, who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous
- buildings, would conclude that the country had, in ancient times, been
- cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature
- occur to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn the events
- of former ages from history; but then we must peruse the volumes in
- which this instruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences
- from one testimony to another, till we arrive at the eyewitnesses and
- spectators of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed not upon
- some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be
- merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected
- with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to
- support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of
- any real existence. If I ask why you believe any particular matter of
- fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason
- will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed
- after this manner, _in infinitum_, you must at last terminate in some
- fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your
- belief is entirely without foundation.
- 38. What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one;
- though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of
- philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived
- merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a
- customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other
- words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of
- objects--flame and heat, snow and cold--have always been conjoined
- together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is
- carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to _believe_ that such a
- quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach.
- This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such
- circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated,
- as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits;
- or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a
- species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the
- thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.
- At this point, it would be very allowable for us to stop our
- philosophical researches. In most questions we can never make a single
- step farther; and in all questions we must terminate here at last, after
- our most restless and curious enquiries. But still our curiosity will be
- pardonable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still farther
- researches, and make us examine more accurately the nature of this
- _belief_, and of the _customary conjunction_, whence it is derived. By
- this means we may meet with some explications and analogies that will
- give satisfaction; at least to such as love the abstract sciences, and
- can be entertained with speculations, which, however accurate, may still
- retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to readers of a different
- taste; the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them,
- and the following enquiries may well be understood, though it be
- neglected.
- PART II.
- 39. Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it
- cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and
- external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding,
- separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction
- and vision. It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of
- reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as
- existent, and paint them out to itself with every circumstance, that
- belongs to any historical fact, which it believes with the greatest
- certainty. Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a
- fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is
- annexed to such a conception as commands our assent, and which is
- wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all
- its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any
- fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases;
- contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in our conception,
- join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is not in our
- power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.
- It follows, therefore, that the difference between _fiction_ and
- _belief_ lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the
- latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be
- commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other
- sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in which the
- mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is
- presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of
- custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is
- usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling
- or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this
- consists the whole nature of belief. For as there is no matter of fact
- which we believe so firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary, there
- would be no difference between the conception assented to and that which
- is rejected, were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one
- from the other. If I see a billiard-ball moving towards another, on a
- smooth table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact. This
- conception implies no contradiction; but still it feels very differently
- from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the
- communication of motion from one ball to another.
- 40. Were we to attempt a _definition_ of this sentiment, we should,
- perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not an impossible task; in the
- same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold or
- passion of anger, to a creature who never had any experience of these
- sentiments. Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling; and no
- one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term; because every
- man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. It may
- not, however, be improper to attempt a _description_ of this sentiment;
- in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may
- afford a more perfect explication of it. I say, then, that belief is
- nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of
- an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This
- variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to
- express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken
- for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in
- the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and
- imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to
- dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its
- ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways possible. It
- may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and
- time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true
- colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible that
- this faculty of imagination can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is
- evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of
- ideas, but in the _manner_ of their conception, and in their _feeling_
- to the mind. I confess, that it is impossible perfectly to explain this
- feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words which express
- something near it. But its true and proper name, as we observed before,
- is _belief_; which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in
- common life. And in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert, that
- _belief_ is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of
- the judgement from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more
- weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces
- them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our
- actions. I hear at present, for instance, a person's voice, with whom I
- am acquainted; and the sound comes as from the next room. This
- impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person,
- together with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as
- existing at present, with the same qualities and relations, of which I
- formerly knew them possessed. These ideas take faster hold of my mind
- than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are very different to the
- feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give
- pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow.
- Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and allow,
- that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense
- and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and
- that this _manner_ of conception arises from a customary conjunction of
- the object with something present to the memory or senses: I believe
- that it will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other
- operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phenomena
- to principles still more general.
- 41. We have already observed that nature has established connexions
- among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our
- thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention
- towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of
- connexion or association we have reduced to three, namely,
- _Resemblance_, _Contiguity_ and _Causation_; which are the only bonds
- that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of
- reflection or discourse, which, in a greater or less degree, takes place
- among all mankind. Now here arises a question, on which the solution of
- the present difficulty will depend. Does it happen, in all these
- relations, that, when one of the objects is presented to the senses or
- memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the
- correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than
- what otherwise it would have been able to attain? This seems to be the
- case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and
- effect. And if the case be the same with the other relations or
- principles of associations, this may be established as a general law,
- which takes place in all the operations of the mind.
- We may, therefore, observe, as the first experiment to our present
- purpose, that, upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend,
- our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the _resemblance_, and that
- every passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or sorrow,
- acquires new force and vigour. In producing this effect, there concur
- both a relation and a present impression. Where the picture bears him no
- resemblance, at least was not intended for him, it never so much as
- conveys our thought to him: And where it is absent, as well as the
- person, though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of
- the other, it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by
- that transition. We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend,
- when it is set before us; but when it is removed, rather choose to
- consider him directly than by reflection in an image, which is equally
- distant and obscure.
- The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be considered as
- instances of the same nature. The devotees of that superstition usually
- plead in excuse for the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that
- they feel the good effect of those external motions, and postures, and
- actions, in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour,
- which otherwise would decay, if directed entirely to distant and
- immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in
- sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by the
- immediate presence of these types, than it is possible for us to do
- merely by an intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have
- always a greater influence on the fancy than any other; and this
- influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related,
- and which they resemble. I shall only infer from these practices, and
- this reasoning, that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas
- is very common; and as in every case a resemblance and a present
- impression must concur, we are abundantly supplied with experiments to
- prove the reality of the foregoing principle.
- 42. We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind,
- in considering the effects of _contiguity_ as well as of _resemblance_.
- It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea, and
- that, upon our approach to any object; though it does not discover
- itself to our senses; it operates upon the mind with an influence, which
- imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily
- transports the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual
- presence of an object, that transports it with a superior vivacity. When
- I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more
- nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant; though even at that
- distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends
- or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter
- case, both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is
- an easy transition between them; that transition alone is not able to
- give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some immediate
- impression[8].
- [8] 'Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut,
- cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros
- acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando
- eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus?
- Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem, quera
- accepimus primum hic disputare solitum: cuius etiam illi
- hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum
- videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic
- Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo; cuius ipsa illa sessio
- fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hostiliam
- dico, non hanc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est
- maior, solebam intuens, Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum
- vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis est in
- locis; ut non sine causa ex his memoriae deducta sit
- disciplina.'
- _Cicero de Finibus_. Lib. v.
- 43. No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other
- two relations of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are
- fond of the reliques of saints and holy men, for the same reason, that
- they seek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and
- give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary
- lives, which they desire to imitate. Now it is evident, that one of the
- best reliques, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of
- a saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in
- this light, it is because they were once at his disposal, and were moved
- and affected by him; in which respect they are to be considered as
- imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of
- consequences than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his
- existence.
- Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead or absent,
- were presented to us; it is evident, that this object would instantly
- revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all past
- intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours than they would
- otherwise have appeared to us. This is another phaenomenon, which seems
- to prove the principle above mentioned.
- 44. We may observe, that, in these phaenomena, the belief of the
- correlative object is always presupposed; without which the relation
- could have no effect. The influence of the picture supposes, that we
- _believe_ our friend to have once existed. Contiguity to home can never
- excite our ideas of home, unless we _believe_ that it really exists. Now
- I assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or
- senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the
- transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I
- throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to
- conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition
- of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It
- derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it
- first begins from an object, present to the senses, it renders the idea
- or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, floating
- reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediately. The thought
- moves instantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of
- conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses.
- When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and
- pain strike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented to
- me, even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance
- of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause
- such a strong conception, except only a present object and a customary
- transition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed
- to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in
- all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence; and it is a
- satisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The
- transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and
- solidity to the related idea.
- Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of
- nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and
- forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet
- our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same
- train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which
- this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence
- of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance
- and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object,
- instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it,
- all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our
- memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to
- ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or
- avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation
- of _final causes_, have here ample subject to employ their wonder and
- admiration.
- 45. I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory,
- that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from
- like causes, and _vice versa_, is so essential to the subsistence of all
- human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the
- fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations;
- appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at
- best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to
- error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of
- nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or
- mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may
- discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be
- independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As
- nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the
- knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has
- she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a
- correspondent course to that which she has established among external
- objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which
- this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.
- SECTION VI.
- OF PROBABILITY[9].
- [9] Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and
- probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable
- all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to
- conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide
- arguments into _demonstrations_, _proofs_, and _probabilities_.
- By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no
- room for doubt or opposition.
- 46. Though there be no such thing as _Chance_ in the world; our
- ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the
- understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.
- There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of
- chances on any side; and according as this superiority encreases, and
- surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a
- proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or
- assent to that side, in which we discover the superiority. If a dye were
- marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides, and with
- another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would
- be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though,
- if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and only one side
- different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or
- expectation of the event more steady and secure. This process of the
- thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who
- consider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious
- speculation.
- It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to discover the
- event, which may result from the throw of such a dye, it considers the
- turning up of each particular side as alike probable; and this is the
- very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended
- in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of sides concur in
- the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to
- that event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various possibilities
- or chances, on which the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of
- several views in one particular event begets immediately, by an
- inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives
- that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a
- smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind. If we
- allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an
- object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, this
- operation may, perhaps, in some measure, be accounted for. The
- concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more
- strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders
- its influence on the passions and affections more sensible; and in a
- word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the nature of
- belief and opinion.
- 47. The case is the same with the probability of causes, as with that of
- chance. There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant
- in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been
- found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always
- burned, and water suffocated every human creature: The production of
- motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto
- admitted of no exception. But there are other causes, which have been
- found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a
- purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who has taken these medicines.
- It is true, when any cause fails of producing its usual effect,
- philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but
- suppose, that some secret causes, in the particular structure of parts,
- have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions
- concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place.
- Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future, in all
- our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we
- expect the event with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any
- contrary supposition. But where different effects have been found to
- follow from causes, which are to _appearance_ exactly similar, all these
- various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the
- future, and enter into our consideration, when we determine the
- probability of the event. Though we give the preference to that which
- has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we
- must not overlook the other effects, but must assign to each of them a
- particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be
- more or less frequent. It is more probable, in almost every country of
- Europe, that there will be frost sometime in January, than that the
- weather will continue open throughout that whole month; though this
- probability varies according to the different climates, and approaches
- to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it seems
- evident, that, when we transfer the past to the future, in order to
- determine the effect, which will result from any cause, we transfer all
- the different events, in the same proportion as they have appeared in
- the past, and conceive one to have existed a hundred times, for
- instance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of
- views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the
- imagination, beget that sentiment which we call _belief,_ and give its
- object the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported
- by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not so frequently to the
- thought in transferring the past to the future. Let any one try to
- account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems
- of philosophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I
- shall think it sufficient, if the present hints excite the curiosity of
- philosophers, and make them sensible how defective all common theories
- are in treating of such curious and such sublime subjects.
- SECTION VII.
- OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.
- PART I.
- 48. The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral
- consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are
- always clear and determinate, the smallest distinction between them is
- immediately perceptible, and the same terms are still expressive of the
- same ideas, without ambiguity or variation. An oval is never mistaken
- for a circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. The isosceles and
- scalenum are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and
- virtue, right and wrong. If any term be defined in geometry, the mind
- readily, of itself, substitutes, on all occasions, the definition for
- the term defined: Or even when no definition is employed, the object
- itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and
- clearly apprehended. But the finer sentiments of the mind, the
- operations of the understanding, the various agitations of the passions,
- though really in themselves distinct, easily escape us, when surveyed by
- reflection; nor is it in our power to recal the original object, as
- often as we have occasion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means,
- is gradually introduced into our reasonings: Similar objects are readily
- taken to be the same: And the conclusion becomes at last very wide of
- the premises.
- One may safely, however, affirm, that, if we consider these sciences in
- a proper light, their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate
- each other, and reduce both of them to a state of equality. If the mind,
- with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and
- determinate, it must carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of
- reasoning, and compare ideas much wider of each other, in order to reach
- the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt,
- without extreme care, to fall into obscurity and confusion, the
- inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the
- intermediate steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the
- sciences which treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is
- scarcely a proposition in Euclid so simple, as not to consist of more
- parts, than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into
- chimera and conceit. Where we trace the principles of the human mind
- through a few steps, we may be very well satisfied with our progress;
- considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning
- causes, and reduces us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance. The chief
- obstacle, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical
- sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The
- principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and
- compass of thought, requisite to the forming of any conclusion. And,
- perhaps, our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the
- want of proper experiments and phaenomena, which are often discovered by
- chance, and cannot always be found, when requisite, even by the most
- diligent and prudent enquiry. As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have
- received less improvement than either geometry or physics, we may
- conclude, that, if there be any difference in this respect among these
- sciences, the difficulties, which obstruct the progress of the former,
- require superior care and capacity to be surmounted.
- 49. There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and
- uncertain, than those of _power, force, energy_ or _necessary
- connexion_, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all
- our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this section, to
- fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove
- some part of that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this
- species of philosophy.
- It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all
- our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words,
- that it is impossible for us to _think_ of any thing, which we have not
- antecedently _felt_, either by our external or internal senses. I have
- endeavoured[10] to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed
- my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater
- clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have
- hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known
- by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or
- simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions
- to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity;
- what resource are we then possessed of? By what invention can we throw
- light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and
- determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or
- original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions
- are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not
- only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their
- correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may,
- perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the
- moral sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so
- enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, and be equally known
- with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of
- our enquiry.
- [10] Section II.
- 50. To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or
- necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find
- the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the
- sources, from which it may possibly be derived.
- When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the
- operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to
- discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the
- effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of
- the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the
- other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the
- second. This is the whole that appears to the _outward_ senses. The mind
- feels no sentiment or _inward_ impression from this succession of
- objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance
- of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or
- necessary connexion.
- From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what
- effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause
- discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without
- experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it,
- by mere dint of thought and reasoning.
- In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible
- qualities, discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine,
- that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other object,
- which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion; these
- qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other
- event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are
- continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted
- succession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is
- entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the
- sensible qualities of body. We know, that, in fact, heat is a constant
- attendant of flame; but what is the connexion between them, we have no
- room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore,
- that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies,
- in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover
- any power, which can be the original of this idea.[11]
- [11] Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, says that, finding
- from experience, that there are several new productions in
- nature, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power
- capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning
- at the idea of power. But no reasoning can ever give us a new,
- original, simple idea; as this philosopher himself confesses.
- This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.
- 51. Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to the senses,
- give us no idea of power or necessary connexion, by their operation in
- particular instances, let us see, whether this idea be derived from
- reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any
- internal impression. It may be said, that we are every moment conscious
- of internal power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our
- will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our
- mind. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new
- idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by
- consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are
- certain, that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are
- possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it
- arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the
- command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and
- faculties of the soul.
- 52. We shall proceed to examine this pretension; and first with regard
- to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This
- influence, we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural
- events, can be known only by experience, and can never be foreseen from
- any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the
- effect, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The
- motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are
- every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the
- energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of
- this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for
- ever escape our most diligent enquiry.
- For _first_; is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than
- the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance
- acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined
- thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by a
- secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit;
- this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more
- beyond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any power
- or energy in the will, we must know this power; we must know its
- connexion with the effect; we must know the secret union of soul and
- body, and the nature of both these substances; by which the one is able
- to operate, in so many instances, upon the other.
- _Secondly_, We are not able to move all the organs of the body with a
- like authority; though we cannot assign any reason besides experience,
- for so remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the
- will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or
- liver? This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a
- power in the former case, not in the latter. We should then perceive,
- independent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of
- the body is circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that
- case fully acquainted with the power or force, by which it operates, we
- should also know, why its influence reaches precisely to such
- boundaries, and no farther.
- A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, or who had newly
- lost those members, frequently endeavours, at first to move them, and
- employ them in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of
- power to command such limbs, as a man in perfect health is conscious of
- power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and
- condition. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in
- the one case nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any power. We
- learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience
- only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without
- instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and
- renders them inseparable.
- _Thirdly,_ We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in
- voluntary motion, is not the member itself which is moved, but certain
- muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still
- more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is successively
- propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the immediate
- object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power,
- by which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly
- and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to the last
- degree mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain
- event: Immediately another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally
- different from the one intended, is produced: This event produces
- another, equally unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the
- desired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it must
- be known: Were it known, its effect also must be known; since all power
- is relative to its effect. And _vice versa,_ if the effect be not known,
- the power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be conscious of a
- power to move our limbs, when we have no such power; but only that to
- move certain animal spirits, which, though they produce at last the
- motion of our limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond
- our comprehension?
- We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope, without any
- temerity, though with assurance; that our idea of power is not copied
- from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we
- give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and
- office. That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of
- common experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy by
- which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown
- and inconceivable.[12]
- [12] It may be pretended, that the resistance which we meet
- with in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and
- call up all our power, this gives us the idea of force and
- power. It is this _nisus_, or strong endeavour, of which we are
- conscious, that is the original impression from which this idea
- is copied. But, first, we attribute power to a vast number of
- objects, where we never can suppose this resistance or exertion
- of force to take place; to the Supreme Being, who never meets
- with any resistance; to the mind in its command over its ideas
- and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the effect
- follows immediately upon the will, without any exertion or
- summoning up of force; to inanimate matter, which is not
- capable of this sentiment. _Secondly,_ This sentiment of an
- endeavour to overcome resistance has no known connexion with
- any event: What follows it, we know by experience; but could
- not know it _Ã priori._ It must, however, be confessed, that
- the animal _nisus,_ which we experience, though it can afford
- no accurate precise idea of power, enters very much into that
- vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed of it.
- 53. Shall we then assert, that we are conscious of a power or energy in
- our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up a new
- idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all sides, and
- at last dismiss it for some other idea, when we think that we have
- surveyed it with sufficient accuracy? I believe the same arguments will
- prove, that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force
- or energy.
- _First,_ It must be allowed, that, when we know a power, we know that
- very circumstance in the cause, by which it is enabled to produce the
- effect: For these are supposed to be synonimous. We must, therefore,
- know both the cause and effect, and the relation between them. But do we
- pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the
- nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This
- is a real creation; a production of something out of nothing: Which
- implies a power so great, that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the
- reach of any being, less than infinite. At least it must be owned, that
- such a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind.
- We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to
- a command of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is
- performed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our
- comprehension.
- _Secondly_, The command of the mind over itself is limited, as well as
- its command over the body; and these limits are not known by reason, or
- any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect, but only by
- experience and observation, as in all other natural events and in the
- operation of external objects. Our authority over our sentiments and
- passions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter
- authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one
- pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries, or show why
- the power is deficient in one case, not in another.
- _Thirdly_, This self-command is very different at different times. A man
- in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness. We
- are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening:
- Fasting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these
- variations, except experience? Where then is the power, of which we
- pretend to be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or
- material substance, or both, some secret mechanism or structure of
- parts, upon which the effect depends, and which, being entirely unknown
- to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and
- incomprehensible?
- Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently
- acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find
- anything in it like this creative power, by which it raises from nothing
- a new idea, and with a kind of _Fiat_, imitates the omnipotence of its
- Maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, who called forth into existence
- all the various scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this
- energy in the will, it requires as certain experience as that of which
- we are possessed, to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever
- result from a simple act of volition.
- 54. The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting
- for the more common and familiar operations of nature--such as the
- descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of
- animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all
- these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by
- which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its
- operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon
- the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its
- usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event
- could result from it. It is only on the discovery of extraordinary
- phaenomena, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind,
- that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to
- explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual
- for men, in such difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible
- intelligent principle[13] as the immediate cause of that event which
- surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the
- common powers of nature. But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny a
- little farther, immediately perceive that, even in the most familiar
- events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most
- unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent _Conjunction_
- of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like
- _Connexion_ between them.
- [13] [Greek: theos apo maechanaes.]
- 55. Here, then, many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to
- have recourse, on all occasions, to the same principle, which the vulgar
- never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural.
- They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be, not only the ultimate and
- original cause of all things, but the immediate and sole cause of every
- event which appears in nature. They pretend that those objects which are
- commonly denominated _causes,_ are in reality nothing but _occasions;_
- and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power
- or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who wills that
- such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each other.
- Instead of saying that one billiard-ball moves another by a force which
- it has derived from the author of nature, it is the Deity himself, they
- say, who, by a particular volition, moves the second ball, being
- determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball, in
- consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in
- the government of the universe. But philosophers advancing still in
- their inquiries, discover that, as we are totally ignorant of the power
- on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no less ignorant
- of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body, or of body
- on mind; nor are we able, either from our senses or consciousness, to
- assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other. The
- same ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They
- assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul
- and body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being
- agitated by external objects, produce sensations in the mind; but that
- it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such
- a sensation, in consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like
- manner, it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in
- our members: It is God himself, who is pleased to second our will, in
- itself impotent, and to command that motion which we erroneously
- attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at
- this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind
- itself, in its internal operations. Our mental vision or conception of
- ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we
- voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its image in
- the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the
- universal Creator, who discovers it to the mind, and renders it
- present to us.
- 56. Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of God.
- Not content with the principle, that nothing exists but by his will,
- that nothing possesses any power but by his concession: They rob nature,
- and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their
- dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate. They consider
- not that, by this theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the
- grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so much to celebrate. It
- argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of
- power to inferior creatures than to produce every thing by his own
- immediate volition. It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the
- fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that, of itself, and by
- its proper operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than
- if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and
- animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine.
- But if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory,
- perhaps the two following reflections may suffice.
- 57. _First_, it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and
- operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with
- it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and
- the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations. Though
- the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there
- must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has
- carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to
- conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and
- experience. We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the
- last steps of our theory; and _there_ we have no reason to trust our
- common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies and
- probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such
- immense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that we are
- guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of verisimilitude and
- experience, we may be assured that this fancied experience has no
- authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the
- sphere of experience. But on this we shall have occasion to touch
- afterwards.[14]
- [14] Section XII.
- _Secondly,_ I cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which this
- theory is founded. We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which
- bodies operate on each other: Their force or energy is entirely
- incomprehensible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force
- by which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates either on itself or on
- body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no
- sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea
- of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own
- faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting
- any thing, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in
- the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter. We surely
- comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more
- difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it
- may arise from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in
- both cases[15].
- [15] I need not examine at length the _vis inertiae_ which is
- so much talked of in the new philosophy, and which is ascribed
- to matter. We find by experience, that a body at rest or in
- motion continues for ever in its present state, till put from
- it by some new cause; and that a body impelled takes as much
- motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself. These are
- facts. When we call this a _vis inertiae_, we only mark these
- facts, without pretending to have any idea of the inert power;
- in the same manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean certain
- effects, without comprehending that active power. It was never
- the meaning of Sir ISAAC NEWTON to rob second causes of all
- force or energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured
- to establish that theory upon his authority. On the contrary,
- that great philosopher had recourse to an etherial active fluid
- to explain his universal attraction; though he was so cautious
- and modest as to allow, that it was a mere hypothesis, not to
- be insisted on, without more experiments. I must confess, that
- there is something in the fate of opinions a little
- extraordinary. DES CARTES insinuated that doctrine of the
- universal and sole efficacy of the Deity, without insisting on
- it. MALEBRANCHE and other CARTESIANS made it the foundation of
- all their philosophy. It had, however, no authority in England.
- LOCKE, CLARKE, and CUDWORTH, never so much as take notice of
- it, but suppose all along, that matter has a real, though
- subordinate and derived power. By what means has it become so
- prevalent among our modern metaphysicians?
- PART II.
- 58. But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which is already
- drawn out to too great a length: We have sought in vain for an idea of
- power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could
- suppose it to be derived. It appears that, in single instances of the
- operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any
- thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend
- any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between
- it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating
- the operations of mind on body--where we observe the motion of the
- latter to follow upon the volition of the former, but are not able to
- observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and
- volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. The
- authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit
- more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not,
- throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is
- conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One
- event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them.
- They seem _conjoined_, but never _connected_. And as we can have no idea
- of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward
- sentiment, the necessary conclusion _seems_ to be that we have no idea
- of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely
- without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or
- common life.
- 59. But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion, and
- one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural object or
- event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or
- penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what
- event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object
- which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one
- instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to
- follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or
- foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an
- unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one
- single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular
- species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with
- another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the
- appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can
- alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one
- object, _Cause;_ the other, _Effect._ We suppose that there is some
- connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly
- produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and
- strongest necessity.
- It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events
- arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant
- conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any
- one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions.
- But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every
- single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only,
- that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by
- habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant,
- and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we
- _feel_ in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from
- one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from
- which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther
- is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never
- find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between
- one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and
- a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time
- a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two
- billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was
- _connected:_ but only that it was _conjoined_ with the other. After he
- has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them
- to be _connected._ What alteration has happened to give rise to this new
- idea of _connexion?_ Nothing but that he now _feels_ these events to be
- connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of
- one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one
- object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a
- connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they
- become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion which is somewhat
- extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will
- its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding,
- or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and
- extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than
- such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of
- human reason and capacity.
- 60. And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising
- ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? For
- surely, if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to
- know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all
- our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it
- alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from
- the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate
- utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate
- future events by their causes. Our thoughts and enquiries are,
- therefore, every moment, employed about this relation: Yet so imperfect
- are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give
- any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something
- extraneous and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined with
- similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience,
- therefore, we may define a cause to be _an object, followed by another,
- and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects
- similar to the second_. Or in other words _where, if the first object
- had not been, the second never had existed_. The appearance of a cause
- always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the
- effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to
- this experience, form another definition of cause, and call it, _an
- object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the
- thought to that other._ But though both these definitions be drawn from
- circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy this inconvenience,
- or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out that
- circumstance in the cause, which gives it a connexion with its effect.
- We have no idea of this connexion, nor even any distinct notion what it
- is we desire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it. We say,
- for instance, that the vibration of this string is the cause of this
- particular sound. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We either
- mean _that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all
- similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds:_ Or, _that this
- vibration is followed by this sound, and that upon the appearance of one
- the mind anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an idea of the
- other._ We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of
- these two lights; but beyond these, we have no idea of it.[16]
- [16] According to these explications and definitions, the idea
- of _power_ is relative as much as that of _cause;_ and both
- have a reference to an effect, or some other event constantly
- conjoined with the former. When we consider the _unknown_
- circumstance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of
- its effect is fixed and determined, we call that its power: And
- accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that the effect
- is the measure of the power. But if they had any idea of power,
- as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself?
- The dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its
- velocity, or the square of its velocity; this dispute, I say,
- need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or
- unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and comparison.
- As to the frequent use of the words, Force, Power, Energy, &c.,
- which every where occur in common conversation, as well as in
- philosophy; that is no proof, that we are acquainted, in any
- instance, with the connecting principle between cause and
- effect, or can account ultimately for the production of one
- thing to another. These words, as commonly used, have very
- loose meanings annexed to them; and their ideas are very
- uncertain and confused. No animal can put external bodies in
- motion without the sentiment of a _nisus_ or endeavour; and
- every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow
- of an external object, that is in motion. These sensations,
- which are merely animal, and from which we can _Ã priori_ draw
- no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and
- to suppose, that they have some such feelings, whenever they
- transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are
- exerted, without our annexing to them any idea of communicated
- motion, we consider only the constant experienced conjunction
- of the events; and as we _feel_ a customary connexion between
- the ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objects; as nothing
- is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal
- sensation, which they occasion.
- 61. To recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings of this section: Every
- idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we
- cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In
- all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is
- nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any
- idea of power or necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances
- appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we
- then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then
- _feel_ a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in
- the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant;
- and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For
- as this idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not from any
- single instance, it must arise from that circumstance, in which the
- number of instances differ from every individual instance. But this
- customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only
- circumstance in which they differ. In every other particular they are
- alike. The first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the
- shock of two billiard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is
- exactly similar to any instance that may, at present, occur to us;
- except only, that we could not, at first, _infer_ one event from the
- other; which we are enabled to do at present, after so long a course of
- uniform experience. I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend
- this reasoning. I am afraid that, should I multiply words about it, or
- throw it into a greater variety of lights, it would only become more
- obscure and intricate. In all abstract reasonings there is one point of
- view which, if we can happily hit, we shall go farther towards
- illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence and copious
- expression in the world. This point of view we should endeavour to
- reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more
- adapted to them.
- SECTION VIII.
- OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
- PART I.
- 62. It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been
- canvassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of
- science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least,
- should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in
- the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the
- true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to
- give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make
- these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future
- scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly,
- we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this
- circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and
- remains still undecided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in
- the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas to the
- terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are
- supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing
- could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it were
- impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could
- so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when
- they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all
- sides, in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their
- antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions
- which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those
- concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual
- system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their
- fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But
- if the question regard any subject of common life and experience,
- nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided
- but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a
- distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.
- 63. This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning
- liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree that, if I be not
- much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and
- ignorant, have always been of the same opinion with regard to this
- subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have
- put an end to the whole controversy. I own that this dispute has been so
- much canvassed on all hands, and has led philosophers into such a
- labyrinth of obscure sophistry, that it is no wonder, if a sensible
- reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of
- such a question, from which he can expect neither instruction or
- entertainment. But the state of the argument here proposed may, perhaps,
- serve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promises at least
- some decision of the controversy, and will not much disturb his ease by
- any intricate or obscure reasoning.
- I hope, therefore, to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in
- the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to any
- reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole
- controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We shall begin with
- examining the doctrine of necessity.
- 64. It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is
- actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so
- precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in
- such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it. The
- degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature,
- prescribed with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise
- from the shock of two bodies as motion in any other degree or direction
- than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just
- and precise idea of _necessity_, we must consider whence that idea
- arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies.
- It seems evident that, if all the scenes of nature were continually
- shifted in such a manner that no two events bore any resemblance to each
- other, but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to
- whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have
- attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connexion among these
- objects. We might say, upon such a supposition, that one object or event
- has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The
- relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind.
- Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from
- that moment, be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only
- canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have
- access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation
- arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of
- nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the
- mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the
- other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which
- we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant _conjunction_ of similar
- objects, and the consequent _inference_ from one to the other, we have
- no notion of any necessity or connexion.
- If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any
- doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the
- voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of mind; it must follow,
- that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity, and that
- they have hitherto disputed, merely for not understanding each other.
- 65. As to the first circumstance, the constant and regular conjunction
- of similar events, we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following
- considerations. It is universally acknowledged that there is a great
- uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that
- human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations.
- The same motives always produce the same actions. The same events follow
- from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship,
- generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and
- distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world,
- and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have
- ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments,
- inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well
- the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much
- mistaken in transferring to the former _most_ of the observations which
- you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same,
- in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or
- strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the
- constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all
- varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with
- materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted
- with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of
- wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of
- experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the
- principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or
- natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants,
- minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms
- concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined
- by Aristotle, and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie
- under our observation than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are
- to those who now govern the world.
- Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of
- men, wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted; men,
- who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no
- pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should
- immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove
- him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration
- with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we
- would explode any forgery in history, we cannot make use of a more
- convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions ascribed to any
- person are directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no human
- motives, in such circumstances, could ever induce him to such a conduct.
- The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected, when he
- describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried
- on singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural
- force and activity, by which he was able to resist them. So readily and
- universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions
- as well as in the operations of body.
- Hence likewise the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and
- a variety of business and company, in order to instruct us in the
- principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as
- speculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of
- men's inclinations and motives, from their actions, expressions, and
- even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of their actions
- from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general
- observations treasured up by a course of experience, give us the clue of
- human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and
- appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass for the
- specious colouring of a cause. And though virtue and honour be allowed
- their proper weight and authority, that perfect disinterestedness, so
- often pretended to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; seldom
- in their leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or
- station. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every
- experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it
- were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind;
- and no experience, however accurately digested by reflection, would ever
- serve to any purpose. Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his
- calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain
- uniformity in the operation of the sun, rain, and earth towards the
- production of vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner
- the rules by which this operation is governed and directed.
- 66. We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions
- should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same
- circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without
- making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and
- opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of
- nature. On the contrary, from observing the variety of conduct in
- different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which
- still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity.
- Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We
- learn thence the great force of custom and education, which mould the
- human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established
- character. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that
- of the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different
- characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes, and which she
- preserves with constancy and regularity? Are the actions of the same
- person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from
- infancy to old age? This affords room for many general observations
- concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations, and
- the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human
- creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar to each individual,
- have a uniformity in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with
- the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach us
- their dispositions, or serve to direct our behaviour with regard
- to them.
- 67. I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to have no
- regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the
- measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government
- of men. But if we would willingly know what judgement should be formed
- of such irregular and extraordinary actions, we may consider the
- sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events
- which appear in the course of nature, and the operations of external
- objects. All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like
- uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be
- disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician, who directs the
- conduct of sensible and intelligent agents.
- The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance,
- attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes
- as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence; though they
- meet with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing
- that, almost in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety
- of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness
- or remoteness, find, that it is at least possible the contrariety of
- events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the
- secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into
- certainty by farther observation, when they remark that, upon an exact
- scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of
- causes, and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no
- better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it
- does not commonly go right: But an artist easily perceives that the same
- force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the
- wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of
- dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of
- several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connexion
- between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its
- seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret
- opposition of contrary causes.
- Thus, for instance, in the human body, when the usual symptoms of health
- or sickness disappoint our expectation; when medicines operate not with
- their wonted powers; when irregular events follow from any particular
- cause; the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter,
- nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the necessity and uniformity
- of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted. They know
- that a human body is a mighty complicated machine: That many secret
- powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehension: That
- to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations: And that
- therefore the irregular events, which outwardly discover themselves, can
- be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest
- regularity in its internal operations and government.
- 68. The philosopher, if he be consistent, must apply the same reasoning
- to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The most irregular
- and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by
- those who know every particular circumstance of their character and
- situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer:
- But he has the toothache, or has not dined. A stupid fellow discovers an
- uncommon alacrity in his carriage: But he has met with a sudden piece of
- good fortune. Or even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be
- particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by others;
- we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain
- degree, inconstant and irregular. This is, in a manner, the constant
- character of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular
- manner, to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but
- proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy. The internal
- principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding
- these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain,
- clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed
- by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity
- and enquiry.
- 69. Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and
- voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause
- and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction
- has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the
- subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life. Now, as it is
- from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future,
- and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which
- we find to have always been conjoined; it may seem superfluous to prove
- that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we
- draw _inferences_ concerning them. But in order to throw the argument
- into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist, though briefly,
- on this latter topic.
- The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce
- any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without
- some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it
- answer fully the intention of the agent. The poorest artificer, who
- labours alone, expects at least the protection of the magistrate, to
- ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour. He also expects
- that, when he carries his goods to market, and offers them at a
- reasonable price, he shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the
- money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities
- which are requisite for his subsistence. In proportion as men extend
- their dealings, and render their intercourse with others more
- complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes of life, a greater
- variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from the proper
- motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclusions they
- take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as in their
- reasonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe that men, as
- well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the same
- that they have ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour
- of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools
- which he employs, and would be equally surprised were his expectations
- disappointed. In short, this experimental inference and reasoning
- concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life that no
- man, while awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not
- reason, therefore, to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the
- doctrine of necessity according to the foregoing definition and
- explication of it?
- 70. Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from the
- people in this particular. For, not to mention that almost every action
- of their life supposes that opinion, there are even few of the
- speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential. What would
- become of _history,_ had we not a dependence on the veracity of the
- historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind? How
- could _politics_ be a science, if laws and forms of goverment had not a
- uniform influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of
- _morals,_ if particular characters had no certain or determinate power
- to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no
- constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ
- our _criticism_ upon any poet or polite author, if we could not
- pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or
- unnatural to such characters, and in such circumstances? It seems almost
- impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind
- without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this _inference_
- from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct.
- And indeed, when we consider how aptly _natural_ and _moral_ evidence
- link together, and form only one chain of argument, we shall make no
- scruple to allow that they are of the same nature, and derived from the
- same principles. A prisoner who has neither money nor interest,
- discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the
- obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is
- surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work
- upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of
- the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees
- his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards, as
- from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain
- train of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape;
- the action of the executioner; the separation of the head and body;
- bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of
- natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference
- between them in passing from one link to another: Nor is less certain of
- the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to
- the memory or senses, by a train of causes, cemented together by what we
- are pleased to call a _physical_ necessity. The same experienced union
- has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives,
- volition, and actions; or figure and motion. We may change the name of
- things; but their nature and their operation on the understanding
- never change.
- Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and with whom I live
- in intimate friendship, to come into my house, where I am surrounded
- with my servants, I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he
- leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish; and I no more
- suspect this event than the falling of the house itself, which is new,
- and solidly built and founded._--But he may have been seized with a
- sudden and unknown frenzy.--_So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake
- and tumble my house about my ears. I shall therefore change the
- suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to
- put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed: And
- this event, I think I can foretell with the same assurance, as that, if
- he throw himself out at the window, and meet with no obstruction, he
- will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an
- unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event, which
- is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature. A man who at
- noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing-Cross, may
- as well expect that it will fly away like a feather, as that he will
- find it untouched an hour after. Above one half of human reasonings
- contain inferences of a similar nature, attended with more or less
- degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct
- of mankind in such particular situations.
- 71. I have frequently considered, what could possibly be the reason why
- all mankind, though they have ever, without hesitation, acknowledged the
- doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning, have yet
- discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words, and have rather
- shown a propensity, in all ages, to profess the contrary opinion. The
- matter, I think, may be accounted for after the following manner. If we
- examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from their
- causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther
- in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular
- objects are _constantly conjoined_ together, and that the mind is
- carried, by a _customary transition,_ from the appearance of one to the
- belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human
- ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men
- still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate
- farther into the powers of nature, and perceive something like a
- necessary connexion between the cause and the effect. When again they
- turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and
- _feel_ no such connexion of the motive and the action; they are thence
- apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which
- result from material force, and those which arise from thought and
- intelligence. But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of
- causation of any kind than merely the _constant conjunction_ of objects,
- and the consequent _inference_ of the mind from one to another, and
- finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have
- place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the same
- necessity common to all causes. And though this reasoning may contradict
- the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the
- determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection, that they
- dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment. Necessity,
- according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been
- rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may
- only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the
- operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and
- effect; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of
- intelligent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon
- examination; and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good
- their assertion, by defining or describing that necessity, and pointing
- it out to us in the operations of material causes.
- 72. It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this
- question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by
- examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding,
- and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple
- question, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent
- matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and
- necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and
- subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these
- circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that necessity, which we
- conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also universally
- acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute is
- at an end; at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal. But
- as long as we will rashly suppose, that we have some farther idea of
- necessity and causation in the operations of external objects; at the
- same time, that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of
- the mind; there is no possibility of bringing the question to any
- determinate issue, while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition. The
- only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher; to examine the
- narrow extent of science when applied to material causes; and to
- convince ourselves that all we know of them is the constant conjunction
- and inference above mentioned. We may, perhaps, find that it is with
- difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human
- understanding: But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to
- apply this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as it is evident
- that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and
- characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we
- must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity, which we have
- already avowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of
- our conduct and behaviour.[17]
- [17] The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted
- for, from another cause, viz. a false sensation or seeming
- experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or
- indifference, in many of our actions. The necessity of any
- action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly
- speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or
- intelligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists
- chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the
- existence of that action from some preceding objects; as
- liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of
- that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference,
- which we feel, in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one
- object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe,
- that, though, in _reflecting_ on human actions, we seldom feel
- such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly able to
- infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and
- from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens,
- that, in _performing_ the actions themselves, we are sensible
- of something like it: And as all resembling objects are readily
- taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonstrative
- and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel, that our
- actions are subject to our will, on most occasions; and imagine
- we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because,
- when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it
- moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a
- _Velleïty,_ as it is called in the schools) even on that side,
- on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we
- persuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been compleated
- into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find,
- upon a second trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not,
- that the fantastical desire of shewing liberty, is here the
- motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we
- may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can
- commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and
- even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might,
- were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our
- situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our
- complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of
- necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.
- 73. But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the
- question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of
- metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many
- words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of
- liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in
- this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by
- liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that
- actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and
- circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of
- uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we
- can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and
- acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean _a
- power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the
- will;_ that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to
- move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed
- to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then,
- is no subject of dispute.
- 74. Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should be careful to
- observe two requisite circumstances; _first,_ that it be consistent with
- plain matter of fact; _secondly,_ that it be consistent with itself. If
- we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible,
- I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with
- regard to it.
- It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its
- existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative
- word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature.
- But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not necessary.
- Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one _define_ a cause,
- without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a _necessary
- connexion_ with its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of
- the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the
- whole controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be
- received, this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a
- regular conjunction with each other, we should never have entertained
- any notion of cause and effect; and this regular conjunction produces
- that inference of the understanding, which is the only connexion, that
- we can have any comprehension of. Whoever attempts a definition of
- cause, exclusive of these circumstances, will be obliged either to
- employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which
- he endeavours to define.[18] And if the definition above mentioned be
- admitted; liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the
- same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no
- existence.
- [18] Thus, if a cause be defined, _that which produces any
- thing;_ it is easy to observe, that _producing_ is synonymous
- to _causing._ In like manner, if a cause be defined, _that by
- which any thing exists;_ this is liable to the same objection.
- For what is meant by these words, _by which?_ Had it been said,
- that a cause is _that_ after which _any thing constantly
- exists;_ we should have understood the terms. For this is,
- indeed, all we know of the matter. And this constancy forms the
- very essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it.
- PART II.
- 75. There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more
- blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation
- of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to
- religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is
- certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because
- it is of dangerous consequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely
- to be forborne; as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only
- to make the person of an antagonist odious. This I observe in general,
- without pretending to draw any advantage from it. I frankly submit to
- an examination of this kind, and shall venture to affirm that the
- doctrines, both of necessity and of liberty, as above explained, are not
- only consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential to
- its support.
- Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to the two definitions of
- _cause_, of which it makes an essential part. It consists either in the
- constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the
- understanding from one object to another. Now necessity, in both these
- senses, (which, indeed, are at bottom the same) has universally, though
- tacitly, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed
- to belong to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny that
- we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those
- inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions, with
- like motives, inclinations, and circumstances. The only particular in
- which any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refuse to
- give the name of necessity to this property of human actions: But as
- long as the meaning is understood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or
- that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the
- operations of matter. But this, it must be acknowledged, can be of no
- consequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural
- philosophy or metaphysics. We may here be mistaken in asserting that
- there is no idea of any other necessity or connexion in the actions of
- body: But surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind, but what
- everyone does, and must readily allow of. We change no circumstance in
- the received orthodox system with regard to the will, but only in that
- with regard to material objects and causes. Nothing, therefore, can be
- more innocent, at least, than this doctrine.
- 76. All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as
- a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform
- influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil
- actions. We may give to this influence what name we please; but, as it
- is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a _cause_, and
- be looked upon as an instance of that necessity, which we would here
- establish.
- The only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature,
- endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or
- injurious actions excite that passion, it is only by their relation to
- the person, or connexion with him. Actions are, by their very nature,
- temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some _cause_ in
- the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can
- neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. The actions
- themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of
- morality and religion: But the person is not answerable for them; and as
- they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and
- leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon
- their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. According
- to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently
- causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most
- horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character
- anywise concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it,
- and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the
- depravity of the other.
- Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and
- casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why? but because the
- principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them
- alone. Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and
- unpremeditately than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what
- reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause or
- principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the
- whole character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended
- with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for?
- but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they
- are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by an
- alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they
- likewise cease to be criminal. But, except upon the doctrine of
- necessity, they never were just proofs, and consequently never
- were criminal.
- 77. It will be equally easy to prove, and from the same arguments, that
- _liberty_, according to that definition above mentioned, in which all
- men agree, is also essential to morality, and that no human actions,
- where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be
- the objects either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects
- of our moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the
- internal character, passions, and affections; it is impossible that they
- can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from
- these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence.
- 78. I pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this
- theory, with regard to necessity and liberty. I can foresee other
- objections, derived from topics which have not here been treated of. It
- may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to
- the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a
- continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined,
- reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of
- every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no
- indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted
- upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the
- world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all
- beings in that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by
- an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore, either
- can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause;
- or if they have any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same
- guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author.
- For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences
- whether the train he employed be long or short; so wherever a continued
- chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, either finite or
- infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author of all the
- rest, and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong
- to them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this
- rule, upon unquestionable reasons, when we examine the consequences of
- any human action; and these reasons must still have greater force when
- applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being infinitely wise and
- powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a
- creature as man; but those imperfections have no place in our Creator.
- He foresaw, he ordained, he intended all those actions of men, which we
- so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must therefore conclude, either
- that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable
- for them. But as either of these positions is absurd and impious, it
- follows, that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly
- be true, as being liable to all the same objections. An absurd
- consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd; in
- the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause,
- if the connexion between them be necessary and evitable.
- This objection consists of two parts, which we shall examine separately;
- _First_, that, if human actions can be traced up, by a necessary chain,
- to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite
- perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend
- nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, _Secondly_, if
- they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we
- ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author
- of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.
- 79. The answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing.
- There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny of all the
- phenomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as one system,
- is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect benevolence;
- and that the utmost possible happiness will, in the end, result to all
- created beings, without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or
- misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this
- benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the Deity
- himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater
- ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this
- theory, some philosophers, and the ancient _Stoics_ among the rest,
- derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught
- their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were, in reality,
- goods to the universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could
- comprehend the whole system of nature, every event became an object of
- joy and exultation. But though this topic be specious and sublime, it
- was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would surely more
- irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by
- preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws, which produced
- the malignant humours in his body, and led them through the proper
- canals, to the sinews and nerves, where they now excite such acute
- torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination
- of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither
- can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by
- the emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain their
- ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections take a
- narrower and more natural survey of their object; and by an economy,
- more suitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings
- around us, and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the
- private system.
- 80. The case is the same with _moral_ as with _physical_ ill. It cannot
- reasonably be supposed, that those remote considerations, which are
- found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more
- powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so
- formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters,
- dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of
- approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its
- frame and constitution. The characters which engage our approbation are
- chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society;
- as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public
- detriment and disturbance: Whence it may reasonably be presumed, that
- the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a
- reflection of these opposite interests. What though philosophical
- meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture; that everything
- is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities, which disturb
- society, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as suitable to the
- primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its
- happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able
- to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and
- immediate view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable
- sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these
- sublime reflections? Why then should his moral resentment against the
- crime be supposed incompatible with them? Or why should not the
- acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice and virtue be
- reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy, as well as that
- of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity? Both these
- distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind:
- And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any
- philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.
- 81. The _second_ objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an
- answer; nor is it possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be
- the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of
- sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and
- unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she
- embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties,
- and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to
- such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human
- actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the
- Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed
- all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her
- temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a
- scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable
- modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common
- life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries,
- without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and
- contradiction!
- SECTION IX.
- OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS.
- 82. All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a
- species of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same
- events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the
- causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference,
- drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man
- ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have
- weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances, which have ever
- fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a
- similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less
- conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree
- of similarity and resemblance. The anatomical observations, formed upon
- one animal, are, by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals;
- and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for instance,
- is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it
- forms a strong presumption, that the same principle has place in all.
- These analogical observations may be carried farther, even to this
- science, of which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we
- explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion
- of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find,
- that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all
- other animals. We shall make trial of this, with regard to the
- hypothesis, by which we have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured
- to account for all experimental reasonings; and it is hoped, that this
- new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations.
- 83. _First_, It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many
- things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always
- follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted
- with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually,
- from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water,
- earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of the effects which result
- from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are
- here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old,
- who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to
- pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to
- the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap,
- and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old
- greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the
- younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles;
- nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded in any
- thing but his observation and experience.
- This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education
- on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments,
- may be taught any course of action, and most contrary to their natural
- instincts and propensities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog
- apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat
- him? Is it not even experience, which makes him answer to his name, and
- infer, from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any
- of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a
- certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?
- In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal infers some fact
- beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is
- altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from
- the present object the same consequences, which it has always found in
- its observation to result from similar objects.
- 84. _Secondly_, It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can
- be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he
- concludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the
- course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there
- be in reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse
- for the observation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well
- employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover
- and observe them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences
- by reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of
- mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are
- philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in
- the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims.
- Nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready, and more
- general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense
- consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be
- trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were
- this doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with
- regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly
- established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the rules
- of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without any
- exception or reserve. It is custom alone, which engages animals, from
- every object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant,
- and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to
- conceive the other, in that particular manner, which we denominate
- _belief_. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all
- the higher, as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall
- under our notice and observation [19].
- [19] Since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived
- merely from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so
- much surpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much
- surpasses another? Has not the same custom the same
- influence on all?
- We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference
- in human understandings: After which the reason of the
- difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended.
- 1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the
- uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we
- always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the
- latter to resemble the former. By means of this general
- habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the
- foundation of reasoning, and expect a similar event with some
- degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made
- accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. It is
- therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe
- the consequences of things; and as one man may very much
- surpass another in attention and memory and observation, this
- will make a very great difference in their reasoning.
- 2. Where there is a complication of causes to produce any
- effect, one mind may be much larger than another, and better
- able to comprehend the whole system of objects, and to infer
- justly their consequences.
- 3. One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a
- greater length than another.
- 4. Few men can think long without running into a confusion of
- ideas, and mistaking one for another; and there are various
- degrees of this infirmity.
- 5. The circumstance, on which the effect depends, is frequently
- involved in other circumstances, which are foreign and
- extrinsic. The separation of it often requires great attention,
- accuracy, and subtilty.
- 6. The forming of general maxims from particular observation is
- a very nice operation; and nothing is more usual, from haste or
- a narrowness of mind, which sees not on all sides, than to
- commit mistakes in this particular.
- 7. When we reason from analogies, the man, who has the greater
- experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies,
- will be the better reasoner.
- 8. Byasses from prejudice, education, passion, party, &c. hang
- more upon one mind than another.
- 9. After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony,
- books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one
- man's experience and thought than those of another.
- It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make
- a difference in the understandings of men.
- 85. But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from
- observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the
- original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they
- possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or
- nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate
- Instincts, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary, and
- inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our
- wonder will, perhaps, cease or diminish, when we consider, that the
- experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts,
- and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species
- of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves;
- and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or
- comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual
- faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an
- instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which
- teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the
- whole economy and order of its nursery.
- SECTION X.
- OF MIRACLES.
- PART I.
- 86. There is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argument against the _real
- presence_, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument
- can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a
- serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned
- prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is
- founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses
- to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission.
- Our evidence, then, for the truth of the _Christian_ religion is less
- than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the
- first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it
- must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one
- rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of
- his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and
- therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly
- revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just
- reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both
- the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry
- not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as
- external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by
- the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.
- Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which
- must at least _silence_ the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and
- free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I
- have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with
- the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of
- superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the
- world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and
- prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.
- 87. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters
- of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether
- infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in
- our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in
- one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but
- it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself
- mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have
- no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us
- beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we
- may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like
- certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all
- countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together:
- Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint
- our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact,
- there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest
- certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.
- A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such
- conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the
- event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience
- as a full _proof_ of the future existence of that event. In other
- cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite
- experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number
- of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and
- when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we
- properly call _probability_. All probability, then, supposes an
- opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found
- to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence,
- proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on
- one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any
- event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is
- contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In
- all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are
- opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to
- know the exact force of the superior evidence.
- 88. To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe,
- that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even
- necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony
- of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of
- reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause
- and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to
- observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from
- no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human
- testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of
- witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any
- discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we
- can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of
- their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not
- to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose
- connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any
- other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree, had not men
- commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they
- not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I
- say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature,
- we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man
- delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no manner of
- authority with us.
- And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony, is
- founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is
- regarded either as a _proof_ or a _probability_, according as the
- conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object
- has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of
- circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this
- kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes,
- that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and
- observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side,
- it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements, and
- with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every
- other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of
- others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or
- uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline
- to it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the
- force of its antagonist.
- 89. This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived
- from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary
- testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the
- manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all
- these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of
- fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few,
- or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they
- affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the
- contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other
- particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of
- any argument, derived from human testimony.
- Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to
- establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that
- case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a
- diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less
- unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians,
- is not derived from any _connexion_, which we perceive _a priori_,
- between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a
- conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has
- seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite
- experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force
- goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which
- remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain
- degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in
- this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they
- endeavour to establish; from which contradition there necessarily arises
- a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.
- _I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato_, was a
- proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that
- philosophical patriot.[20] The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed,
- might invalidate so great an authority.
- [20] Plutarch, in vita Catonis.
- The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning
- the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very
- strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state
- of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little
- analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform
- experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were
- not conformable to it.[21]
- [21] No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water
- did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a
- situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to
- tell _a priori _what will result from it. It is making a new
- experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One
- may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but
- still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that,
- in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to
- the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would
- not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not
- gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it
- comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from
- the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event,
- therefore, may be denominated _extraordinary_, and requires a
- pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a
- warm climate: But still it is not _miraculous_, nor contrary to
- uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all
- the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra
- have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the
- freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they
- never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore
- they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the
- consequence.
- 90. But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of
- witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of
- being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the
- testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in
- that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must
- prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that
- of its antagonist.
- A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and
- unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a
- miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument
- from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable,
- that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in
- the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless
- it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and
- there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a
- miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever
- happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man,
- seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of
- death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently
- observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to
- life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There
- must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event,
- otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform
- experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full _proof_,
- from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor
- can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by
- an opposite proof, which is superior.[22]
- [22] Sometimes an event may not, _in itself_, seem to be
- contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it
- might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a
- miracle; because, in _fact_, it is contrary to these laws. Thus
- if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick
- person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the
- clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order
- many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command;
- these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are
- really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if
- any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by
- accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws
- of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a
- miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can
- be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a
- man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately
- defined, _a transgression of a law of nature by a particular
- volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some
- invisible agent_. A miracle may either be discoverable by men
- or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of
- a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising
- of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force
- requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so
- sensible with regard to us.
- 91. The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our
- attention), 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle,
- unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more
- miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in
- that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior
- only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which
- remains, after deducting the inferior.' When anyone tells me, that he
- saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself,
- whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or
- be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have
- happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to
- the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always
- reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be
- more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till
- then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
- PART II.
- 92. In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony,
- upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof,
- and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it
- is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our
- concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on
- so full an evidence.
- For _first_, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle
- attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense,
- education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in
- themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all
- suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation
- in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their
- being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts
- performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the
- world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances
- are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.
- 93. _Secondly_. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if
- strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance,
- which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The
- maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is,
- that the objects, of which we have no experience, resembles those, of
- which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most
- probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought
- to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of
- past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily
- reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree;
- yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule;
- but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather
- the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very
- circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of
- _surprise_ and _wonder_, arising from miracles, being an agreeable
- emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events,
- from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who
- cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous
- events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the
- satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight
- in exciting the admiration of others.
- With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received,
- their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of
- wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the
- spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of
- common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all
- pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and
- imagine he sees what has no reality: he may know his narrative to be
- false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world,
- for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: or even where this delusion
- has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on
- him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other
- circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not
- have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgement to canvass his
- evidence: what judgement they have, they renounce by principle, in these
- sublime and mysterious subjects: or if they were ever so willing to
- employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of
- its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence: and his
- impudence overpowers their credulity.
- Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or
- reflection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the
- affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their
- understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a Tully
- or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian
- audience, every _Capuchin_, every itinerant or stationary teacher can
- perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by
- touching such gross and vulgar passions.
- The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural
- events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary
- evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove
- sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and
- the marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all
- relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with
- regard to the most common and most credible events. For instance: There
- is no kind of report which rises so easily, and spreads so quickly,
- especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning
- marriages; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see
- each other twice, but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them
- together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of
- propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the
- intelligence. And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives
- attention to these reports, till he find them confirmed by some greater
- evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline
- the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greatest
- vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles?
- 94. _Thirdly_. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural
- and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among
- ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given
- admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received
- them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with
- that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend received
- opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt
- to imagine ourselves transported into some new world; where the whole
- frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations
- in a different manner, from what it does at present. Battles,
- revolutions, pestilence, famine and death, are never the effect of those
- natural causes, which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles,
- judgements, quite obscure the few natural events, that are intermingled
- with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as
- we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is
- nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds
- from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous, and that,
- though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and
- learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.
- _It is strange_, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of
- these wonderful historians, _that such prodigious_ _events never happen
- in our days_. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in
- all ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty.
- You have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which,
- being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last
- been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned lies,
- which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from
- like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last
- into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.
- It was a wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander, who though now
- forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures
- in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people were extremely
- ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion.
- People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all
- worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The
- stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are
- industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and learned are
- contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing
- themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly
- refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed,
- from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to the enlisting of votaries, even
- among the Grecian philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and
- distinction in Rome: nay, could engage the attention of that sage
- emperor Marcus Aurelius; so far as to make him trust the success of a
- military expedition to his delusive prophecies.
- The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant
- people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on
- the generality of them (_which, though seldom, is sometimes the case_)
- it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if
- the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and
- knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry
- the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence,
- or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the
- delusion. Men's inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to
- display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the
- place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand
- miles distance. But had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the
- philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread,
- throughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which,
- being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of
- reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is
- true; Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had an opportunity
- of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does
- not always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to
- expose and detect his impostures.
- 95. I may add as a _fourth_ reason, which diminishes the authority of
- prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not
- been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of
- witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of
- testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better
- understood, let us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is
- different is contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of
- ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be
- established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended
- to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound
- in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system
- to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more
- indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival
- system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that
- system was established; so that all the prodigies of different
- religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of
- these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other.
- According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of
- Mahomet or his successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of a
- few barbarous Arabians: And on the other hand, we are to regard the
- authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all the
- authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have
- related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we are to
- regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that
- Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the
- same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument
- may appear over subtile and refined; but is not in reality different
- from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two
- witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the
- testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues
- distant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been
- committed.
- 96. One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that
- which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria,
- by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot;
- in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to
- have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story may
- be seen in that fine historian[23]; where every circumstance seems to add
- weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the
- force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to
- enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The
- gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through
- the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his
- friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of
- divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian, a
- cotemporary writer, noted for candour and veracity, and withal, the
- greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so
- free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the
- contrary imputation, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from whose
- authority he related the miracle, of established character for judgement
- and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and
- confirming their testimony, after the Flavian family was despoiled of
- the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie.
- _Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam nullum
- mendacio pretium_. To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as
- related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger
- for so gross and so palpable a falsehood.
- [23] Hist. lib. iv. cap. 81. Suetonius gives nearly the same
- account _in vita_ Vesp.
- There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz, which may
- well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled
- into Spain, to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through
- Saragossa, the capital of Arragon, where he was shewn, in the cathedral,
- a man, who had served seven years as a door-keeper, and was well known
- to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church.
- He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that
- limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump; and the cardinal assures
- us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the
- canons of the church; and the whole company in town were appealed to for
- a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous
- devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relater was
- also cotemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and
- libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so
- _singular_ a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the
- witnesses very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the
- fact, to which they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the
- force of the evidence, and may double our surprise on this occasion, is,
- that the cardinal himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any
- credit to it, and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in
- the holy fraud. He considered justly, that it was not requisite, in
- order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to disprove
- the testimony, and to trace its falsehood, through all the circumstances
- of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew, that, as this was
- commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place;
- so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately present,
- by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great
- part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such
- an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a
- miracle, supported by any human testimony, was more properly a subject
- of derision than of argument.
- There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one
- person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought in
- France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose
- sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving
- hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of
- as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more
- extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the
- spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of
- credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent
- theatre that is now in the world. Nor is this all: a relation of them
- was published and dispersed every where; nor were the _Jesuits_, though
- a learned body, supported by the civil magistrate, and determined
- enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to
- have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them[24].
- Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the
- corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of
- witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the
- events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all
- reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.
- [24] This book was writ by Mons. Montgeron, counsellor or judge
- of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and character, who
- was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be somewhere
- in a dungeon on account of his book.
- There is another book in three volumes (called _Recueil des
- Miracles de l'Abbé_ Paris) giving an account of many of these
- miracles, and accompanied with prefatory discourses, which are
- very well written. There runs, however, through the whole of
- these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our
- Saviour and those of the Abbé; wherein it is asserted, that the
- evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former: As if
- the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that
- of God himself, who conducted the pen of the inspired writers.
- If these writers, indeed, were to be considered merely as human
- testimony, the French author is very moderate in his
- comparison; since he might, with some appearance of reason,
- pretend, that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the other in
- evidence and authority. The following circumstances are drawn
- from authentic papers, inserted in the above-mentioned book.
- Many of the miracles of Abbé Paris were proved immediately by
- witnesses before the officiality or bishop's court at Paris,
- under the eye of cardinal Noailles, whose character for
- integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies.
- His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the
- Jansenists, and for that reason promoted to the see by the
- court. Yet 22 rectors or curés of Paris, with infinite
- earnestness, press him to examine those miracles, which they
- assert to be known to the whole world, and undisputably
- certain: But he wisely forbore.
- The Molinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in one
- instance, that of Mademoiselle le Franc. But, besides that
- their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in
- the world, particularly in citing only a few of the Jansenist
- witnesses, whom they tampered with: Besides this, I say, they
- soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses,
- one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of
- credit and substance in Paris, who gave oath for the miracle.
- This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the
- parliament. But the parliament were forbidden by authority to
- meddle in the affair. It was at last observed, that where men
- are heated by zeal and enthusiasm, there is no degree of human
- testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest
- absurdity: And those who will be so silly as to examine the
- affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the
- testimony, are almost sure to be confounded. It must be a
- miserable imposture, indeed, that does not prevail in
- that contest.
- All who have been in France about that time have heard of the
- reputation of Mons. Heraut, the _lieutenant de Police_, whose
- vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelligence
- have been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature of
- his office is almost absolute, was vested with full powers, on
- purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles; and he
- frequently seized immediately, and examined the witnesses and
- subjects of them: But never could reach any thing satisfactory
- against them.
- In the case of Mademoiselle Thibaut he sent the famous De Sylva
- to examine her; whose evidence is very curious. The physician
- declares, that it was impossible she could have been so ill as
- was proved by witnesses; because it was impossible she could,
- in so short a time, have recovered so perfectly as he found
- her. He reasoned, like a man of sense, from natural causes; but
- the opposite party told him, that the whole was a miracle, and
- that his evidence was the very best proof of it.
- The Molinists were in a sad dilemma. They durst not assert the
- absolute insufficiency of human evidence, to prove a miracle.
- They were obliged to say, that these miracles were wrought by
- witchcraft and the devil. But they were told, that this was the
- resource of the Jews of old.
- No Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation
- of the miracles, when the church-yard was shut up by the king's
- edict. It was the touch of the tomb, which produced these
- extraordinary effects; and when no one could approach the tomb,
- no effects could be expected. God, indeed, could have thrown
- down the walls in a moment; but he is master of his own graces
- and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them. He did
- not throw down the walls of every city like those of Jericho,
- on the sounding of the rams horns, nor break up the prison of
- every apostle, like that of St. Paul.
- No less a man, than the Due de Chatillon, a duke and peer of
- France, of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a
- miraculous cure, performed upon a servant of his, who had lived
- several years in his house with a visible and palpable
- infirmity. I shall conclude with observing, that no clergy are
- more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the
- secular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or curés of
- Paris, who bear testimony to these impostures. The learning,
- genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the austerity of the
- nuns of Port-Royal, have been much celebrated all over Europe.
- Yet they all give evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece
- of the famous Pascal, whose sanctity of life, as well as
- extraordinary capacity, is well known. The famous Racine gives
- an account of this miracle in his famous history of Port-Royal,
- and fortifies it with all the proofs, which a multitude of
- nuns, priests, physicians, and men of the world, all of them of
- undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several men of letters,
- particularly the bishop of Tournay, thought this miracle so
- certain, as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and
- free-thinkers. The queen-regent of France, who was extremely
- prejudiced against the Port-Royal, sent her own physician to
- examine the miracle, who returned an absolute convert. In
- short, the supernatural cure was so uncontestable, that it
- saved, for a time, that famous monastery from the ruin with
- which it was threatened by the Jesuits. Had it been a cheat, it
- had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful
- antagonists, and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers.
- Our divines, who can build up a formidable castle from such
- despicable materials; what a prodigious fabric could they have
- reared from these and many other circumstances, which I have
- not mentioned! How often would the great names of Pascal,
- Racine, Amaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears? But if they
- be wise, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more
- worth, a thousand times, than all the rest of the collection.
- Besides, it may serve very much to their purpose. For that
- miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy
- prickle of the holy thorn, which composed the holy crown,
- which, &c.
- 97. Is the consequence just, because some human testimony has the utmost
- force and authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of
- Philippi or Pharsalia for instance; that therefore all kinds of
- testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose
- that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions had, each of them, claimed the
- victory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had
- uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side; how could mankind,
- at this distance, have been able to determine between them? The
- contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by Herodotus
- or Plutarch, and those delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish
- historian.
- The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the
- passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family,
- or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations
- and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a
- missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not
- encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a
- character? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man
- has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the
- delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds, in support of
- so holy and meritorious a cause?
- The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because the
- materials are always prepared for it. The _avidum genus auricularum_[25],
- the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever
- sooths superstition, and promotes wonder.
- [25] Lucret.
- How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and
- exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a
- time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such
- reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is
- obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and
- observation, when we account for it by the known and natural principles
- of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to
- so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most
- established laws of nature?
- I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any
- private or even public history, at the place, where it is said to
- happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance.
- Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and
- judgement, which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to
- distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But
- the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of
- altercations and debate and flying rumours; especially when men's
- passions have taken part on either side.
- In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem
- the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And
- when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to
- undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records
- and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished
- beyond recovery.
- No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the
- very testimony itself of the reporters: and these, though always
- sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall
- under the comprehension of the vulgar.
- 98. Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of
- miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and
- that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by
- another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would
- endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to
- human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the
- laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are
- contrary, we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other,
- and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that
- assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the
- principle here explained, this substraction, with regard to all popular
- religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may
- establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as
- to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system
- of religion.
- 99. I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a
- miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of
- religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or
- violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of
- proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to
- find any such in all the records of history. Thus, suppose, all authors,
- in all languages, agree, that, from the first of January 1600, there was
- a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: suppose that the
- tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among
- the people: that all travellers, who return from foreign countries,
- bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or
- contradiction: it is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of
- doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search
- for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and
- dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many
- analogies, that any phenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards
- that catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that
- testimony be very extensive and uniform.
- But suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should agree,
- that, on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both
- before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole
- court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was
- acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being
- interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed
- England for three years: I must confess that I should be surprised at
- the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the
- least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt
- of her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that
- followed it: I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it
- neither was, nor possibly could be real. You would in vain object to me
- the difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an
- affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgement of that
- renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap
- from so poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still
- reply, that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena, that
- I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from
- their concurrence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws
- of nature.
- But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men,
- in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that
- kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and
- sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the
- fact, but even reject it without farther examination. Though the Being
- to whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does
- not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is
- impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being,
- otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, in
- the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation,
- and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the
- testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by
- miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable.
- As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning
- religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact;
- this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and
- make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it,
- with whatever specious pretence it may be covered.
- Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. 'We
- ought,' says he, 'to make a collection or particular history of all
- monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of every
- thing new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done with
- the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every
- relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree
- upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy: And no less so, every thing
- that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchimy, or such
- authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for
- falsehood and fable[26].'
- [26] Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 29.
- 100. I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here
- delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends
- or disguised enemies to the _Christian Religion_, who have undertaken to
- defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is
- founded on _Faith_, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing
- it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To
- make this more evident, let us examine those miracles, related in
- scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine
- ourselves to such as we find in the _Pentateuch_, which we shall
- examine, according to the principles of these pretended Christians, not
- as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere
- human writer and historian. Here then we are first to consider a book,
- presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age
- when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after
- the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and
- resembling those fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its
- origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and
- miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human
- nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state:
- Of the age of man, extended to near a thousand years: Of the destruction
- of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the
- favourites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: Of
- their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing
- imaginable: I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a
- serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of
- such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary
- and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however,
- necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of
- probability above established.
- 101. What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any
- variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles,
- and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did
- not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it
- would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine
- mission or authority from heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may
- conclude, that the _Christian Religion_ not only was at first attended
- with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable
- person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its
- veracity: And whoever is moved by _Faith_ to assent to it, is conscious
- of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the
- principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to
- believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.
- SECTION XI.
- OF A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE AND OF A FUTURE STATE.
- 102. I was lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves
- sceptical paradoxes; where, though he advanced many principles, of which
- I can by no means approve, yet as they seem to be curious, and to bear
- some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this
- enquiry, I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can,
- in order to submit them to the judgement of the reader.
- Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of
- philosophy, which, as it requires entire liberty above all other
- privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of
- sentiments and argumentation, received its first birth in an age and
- country of freedom and toleration, and was never cramped, even in its
- most extravagant principles, by any creeds, concessions, or penal
- statutes. For, except the banishment of Protagoras, and the death of
- Socrates, which last event proceeded partly from other motives, there
- are scarcely any instances to be met with, in ancient history, of this
- bigotted jealousy, with which the present age is so much infested.
- Epicurus lived at Athens to an advanced age, in peace and tranquillity:
- Epicureans[27] were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character,
- and to officiate at the altar, in the most sacred rites of the
- established religion: And the public encouragement[28] of pensions and
- salaries was afforded equally, by the wisest of all the Roman
- emperors[29], to the professors of every sect of philosophy. How
- requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy, in her early youth,
- will easily be conceived, if we reflect, that, even at present, when she
- may be supposed more hardy and robust, she bears with much difficulty
- the inclemency of the seasons, and those harsh winds of calumny and
- persecution, which blow upon her.
- [27] Luciani [Greek: symp. ae Lapithai].
- [28] Luciani [Greek: eunouchos].
- [29] Luciani and Dio.
- You admire, says my friend, as the singular good fortune of philosophy,
- what seems to result from the natural course of things, and to be
- unavoidable in every age and nation. This pertinacious bigotry, of which
- you complain, as so fatal to philosophy, is really her offspring, who,
- after allying with superstition, separates himself entirely from the
- interest of his parent, and becomes her most inveterate enemy and
- persecutor. Speculative dogmas of religion, the present occasions of
- such furious dispute, could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the
- early ages of the world; when mankind, being wholly illiterate, formed
- an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension, and
- composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects
- of traditional belief, more than of argument or disputation. After the
- first alarm, therefore, was over, which arose from the new paradoxes and
- principles of the philosophers; these teachers seem ever after, during
- the ages of antiquity, to have lived in great harmony with the
- established superstition, and to have made a fair partition of mankind
- between them; the former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter
- possessing all the vulgar and illiterate.
- 103. It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of the
- question, and never suppose, that a wise magistrate can justly be
- jealous of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those of Epicurus,
- which, denying a divine existence, and consequently a providence and a
- future state, seem to loosen, in a great measure, the ties of morality,
- and may be supposed, for that reason, pernicious to the peace of
- civil society.
- I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions never, in any age,
- proceeded from calm reason, or from experience of the pernicious
- consequences of philosophy; but arose entirely from passion and
- prejudice. But what if I should advance farther, and assert, that if
- Epicurus had been accused before the people, by any of the _sycophants_
- or informers of those days, he could easily have defended his cause, and
- proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his
- adversaries, who endeavoured, with such zeal, to expose him to the
- public hatred and jealousy?
- I wish, said I, you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a
- topic, and make a speech for Epicurus, which might satisfy, not the mob
- of Athens, if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have
- contained any mob, but the more philosophical part of his audience, such
- as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments.
- The matter would not be difficult, upon such conditions, replied he: And
- if you please, I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment, and make
- you stand for the Athenian people, and shall deliver you such an
- harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans, and leave not a
- black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries.
- Very well: Pray proceed upon these suppositions.
- 104. I come hither, O ye Athenians, to justify in your assembly what I
- maintained in my school, and I find myself impeached by furious
- antagonists, instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers.
- Your deliberations, which of right should be directed to questions of
- public good, and the interest of the commonwealth, are diverted to the
- disquisitions of speculative philosophy; and these magnificent, but
- perhaps fruitless enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more
- useful occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse.
- We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of
- worlds. We shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public
- interest. And if I can persuade you, that they are entirely indifferent
- to the peace of society and security of government, I hope that you will
- presently send us back to our schools, there to examine, at leisure, the
- question the most sublime, but at the same time, the most speculative of
- all philosophy.
- The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition of your
- forefathers, and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly
- acquiesce), indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can
- establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby
- excite, instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a
- diligent and scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent
- colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and
- then ask, if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from
- the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the
- greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the
- justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as solid as my
- antagonists and accusers can desire. It is sufficient, if I can prove,
- from this very reasoning, that the question is entirely speculative, and
- that, when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a providence and a
- future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance
- principles, which they themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue
- consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory.
- 105. You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged, that the chief or
- sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is
- derived from the order of nature; where there appear such marks of
- intelligence and design, that you think it extravagant to assign for its
- cause, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You
- allow, that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes. From the
- order of the work, you infer, that there must have been project and
- forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you
- allow, that your conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the
- conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will
- justify. These are your concessions. I desire you to mark the
- consequences.
- When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion
- the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause
- any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A
- body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof, that the
- counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a
- reason that it exceeds a hundred. If the cause, assigned for any effect,
- be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or
- add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the
- effect. But if we ascribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable
- of producing other effects, we can only indulge the licence of
- conjecture, and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and
- energies, without reason or authority.
- The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious
- matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by
- the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what
- are precisely requisite to produce the effect: Nor can we, by any rules
- of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects
- from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely
- from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures, could know, that he was also
- a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and
- marble than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the
- particular work before us; these we may safely conclude the workman to
- be possessed of. The cause must be proportioned to the effect; and if
- we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any
- qualities, that point farther, or afford an inference concerning any
- other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what
- is merely requisite for producing the effect, which we examine.
- 106. Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or
- order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise degree
- of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their
- workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in
- the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of
- argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at
- present, appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The
- supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the
- supposition, that, in distant regions of space or periods of time, there
- has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes,
- and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues.
- We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to
- Jupiter, the cause; and then descend downwards, to infer any new effect
- from that cause; as if the present effects alone were not entirely
- worthy of the glorious attributes, which we ascribe to that deity. The
- knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect, they must
- be exactly adjusted to each other; and the one can never refer to
- anything farther, or be the foundation of any new inference and
- conclusion.
- You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You
- imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of
- this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible, but he
- must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene
- of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget, that this
- superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at
- least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to
- ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted
- and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O
- philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: and
- presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in
- order to suit them to the attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to
- your deities.
- 107. When priests and poets, supported by your authority, O Athenians,
- talk of a golden or silver age, which preceded the present state of vice
- and misery, I hear them with attention and with reverence. But when
- philosophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate reason,
- hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same obsequious
- submission and pious deference. I ask; who carried them into the
- celestial regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who
- opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that
- their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what
- has actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the
- steps or by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from
- effects to causes, I still insist, that they have aided the ascent of
- reason by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change
- their manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects; presuming,
- that a more perfect production than the present world would be more
- suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they
- have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or
- any attribute, but what can be found in the present world.
- Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of
- nature, and save the honour of the gods; while we must acknowledge the
- reality of that evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds.
- The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the
- observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause,
- which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him
- to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so
- unhappy. These attributes then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken for
- granted, in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own
- that such conjectures may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible solutions
- of the ill phenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for
- granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually
- appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of
- nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely
- imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course
- of nature?
- The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be considered only as a
- particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the
- universe: but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any
- single fact, and alter or add to the phenomena, in any single
- particular. If you think, that the appearances of things prove such
- causes, it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the
- existence of these causes. In such complicated and sublime subjects,
- every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument.
- But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and arguing from your
- inferred causes, conclude, that any other fact has existed, or will
- exist, in the course of nature, which may serve as a fuller display of
- particular attributes; I must admonish you, that you have departed from
- the method of reasoning, attached to the present subject, and have
- certainly added something to the attributes of the cause, beyond what
- appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense
- or propriety, add anything to the effect, in order to render it more
- worthy of the cause.
- 108. Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in
- my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find
- in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the
- peace and order of society, is in the least concerned?
- I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who
- guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and
- disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success, in all
- their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events,
- which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge,
- that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace
- of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the
- world. I am sensible, that, according to the past experience of mankind,
- friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only
- source of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the
- virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, to a
- well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. And
- what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings?
- You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things proceeds from
- intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition
- itself, on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our
- conduct and deportment in life is still the same. It is still open for
- me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of past
- events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed,
- and a supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect
- some more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad,
- beyond the ordinary course of events; I here find the same fallacy,
- which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining,
- that, if we grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly
- contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add something
- to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes which
- you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember, that all your
- reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes; and
- that every argument, deducted from causes to effects, must of necessity
- be a gross sophism; since it is impossible for you to know anything of
- the cause, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered
- to the full, in the effect.
- 109. But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners, who,
- instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of
- their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to
- render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which
- leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue, which
- serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and
- propriety? Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea
- of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination surely. For if they
- derived it from the present phenomena, it would never point to anything
- farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may
- _possibly_ be endowed with attributes, which we have never seen exerted;
- may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover to be
- satisfied: all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere
- _possibility_ and hypothesis. We never can have reason to _infer_ any
- attributes, or any principles of action in him, but so far as we know
- them to have been exerted and satisfied.
- _Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world?_ If you
- answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts
- itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude, that
- you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the
- gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying,
- that the justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not
- in its full extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any
- particular extent, but only so far as you see it, _at present_,
- exert itself.
- 110. Thus I bring the dispute, O Athenians, to a short issue with my
- antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well
- as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by
- which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in
- the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in
- the school, or in the closet. In vain would our limited understanding
- break through those boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond
- imagination. While we argue from the course of nature, and infer a
- particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves
- order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain
- and useless. It is uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond
- the reach of human experience. It is useless; because our knowledge of
- this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can
- never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the
- cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and
- experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct
- and behaviour.
- 111. I observe (said I, finding he had finished his harangue) that you
- neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old; and as you were
- pleased to make me stand for the people, you insinuate yourself into my
- favour by embracing those principles, to which, you know, I have always
- expressed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience
- (as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgement
- concerning this, and all other questions of fact; I doubt not but, from
- the very same experience, to which you appeal, it may be possible to
- refute this reasoning, which you have put into the mouth of Epicurus.
- If you saw, for instance, a half-finished building, surrounded with
- heaps of brick and stone and mortar, and all the instruments of masonry;
- could you not _infer_ from the effect, that it was a work of design and
- contrivance? And could you not return again, from this inferred cause,
- to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building
- would soon be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which
- art could bestow upon it? If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one
- human foot, you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that
- he had also left the traces of the other foot, though effaced by the
- rolling of the sands or inundation of the waters. Why then do you refuse
- to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of
- nature? Consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect
- building, from which you can infer a superior intelligence; and arguing
- from that superior intelligence, which can leave nothing imperfect; why
- may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive its
- completion in some distant point of space or time? Are not these methods
- of reasoning exactly similar? And under what pretence can you embrace
- the one, while you reject the other?
- 112. The infinite difference of the subjects, replied he, is a
- sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of
- _human_ art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect
- to the cause, and returning back from the cause, to form new inferences
- concerning the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has
- probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of
- this method of reasoning? Plainly this; that man is a being, whom we
- know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with,
- and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and
- coherence, according to the laws which nature has established for the
- government of such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work
- has proceeded from the skill and industry of man; as we are otherwise
- acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred
- inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and these
- inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we
- know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it
- were impossible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of
- all the qualities, which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived
- from the production, it is impossible they could point to anything
- farther, or be the foundation of any new inference. The print of a foot
- in the sand can only prove, when considered alone, that there was some
- figure adapted to it, by which it was produced: but the print of a human
- foot proves likewise, from our other experience, that there was probably
- another foot, which also left its impression, though effaced by time or
- other accidents. Here we mount from the effect to the cause; and
- descending again from the cause, infer alterations in the effect; but
- this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We
- comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations,
- concerning the _usual_ figure and members of that species of animal,
- without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious
- and sophistical.
- 113. The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of
- nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a
- single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or
- genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by
- analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews
- wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a
- particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of
- them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther
- attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes, we can never be
- authorised to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now,
- without some such licence of supposition, it is impossible for us to
- argue from the cause, or infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what
- has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater good produced by
- this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness: a more
- impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a
- greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed addition to the
- works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of
- nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or
- argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and
- hypothesis[30].
- [30] In general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim,
- that where any cause is known only by its particular effects,
- it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause;
- since the qualities, which are requisite to produce these new
- effects along with the former, must either be different, or
- superior, or of more extensive operation, than those which
- simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed
- to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reason to
- suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that the new
- effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy,
- which is already known from the first effects, will not remove
- the difficulty. For even granting this to be the case (which
- can seldom be supposed), the very continuation and exertion of
- a like energy (for it is impossible it can be absolutely the
- same), I say, this exertion of a like energy, in a different
- period of space and time, is a very arbitrary supposition, and
- what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects,
- from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally
- derived. Let the _inferred_ cause be exactly proportioned (as
- it should be) to the known effect; and it is impossible that
- it can possess any qualities, from which new or different
- effects can be _inferred_.
- The great source of our mistake in this subject, and of the unbounded
- licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly consider
- ourselves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he
- will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct, which we ourselves,
- in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But,
- besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost
- everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from
- ours; besides this, I say, it must evidently appear contrary to all
- rules of analogy to reason, from the intentions and projects of men, to
- those of a Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature,
- there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so
- that when, from any fact, we have discovered one intention of any man,
- it may often be reasonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw
- a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But
- this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being, so
- remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other
- being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper, and who discovers
- himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no
- authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine
- to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect. Or were it ever so
- much a perfection, the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being, where it
- appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works,
- savours more of flattery and panegyric, than of just reasoning and sound
- philosophy. All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the
- religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be
- able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us
- measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are
- furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be
- inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold;
- no reward or punishment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already
- known by practice and observation. So that my apology for Epicurus will
- still appear solid and satisfactory; nor have the political interests
- of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning
- metaphysics and religion.
- 114. There is still one circumstance, replied I, which you seem to have
- overlooked. Though I should allow your premises, I must deny your
- conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reasonings _can_
- have no influence on life, because they _ought_ to have no influence;
- never considering, that men reason not in the same manner you do, but
- draw many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and
- suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on vice, and bestow
- rewards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature.
- Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not, is no matter. Its
- influence on their life and conduct must still be the same. And, those,
- who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know,
- be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and
- politicians; since they free men from one restraint upon their passions,
- and make the infringement of the laws of society, in one respect, more
- easy and secure.
- After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general conclusion in favour of
- liberty, though upon different premises from those, on which you
- endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought to tolerate every
- principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any government
- has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence. There is no
- enthusiasm among philosophers; their doctrines are not very alluring to
- the people; and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings, but what
- must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences, and even to the state,
- by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points, where the
- generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned.
- 115. But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main
- topic, a difficulty, which I shall just propose to you without insisting
- on it; lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature.
- In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known
- only by its effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so
- singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no
- similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under
- our observation. It is only when two _species_ of objects are found to
- be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and
- were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be
- comprehended under any known _species_, I do not see, that we could form
- any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience
- and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can
- reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and
- cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and
- causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be
- conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflection to pursue
- the consequences of this principle. I shall just observe, that, as the
- antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the universe, an effect quite
- singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less
- singular and unparalleled; your reasonings, upon that supposition, seem,
- at least, to merit our attention. There is, I own, some difficulty, how
- we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning from our
- ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any
- addition to it.
- SECTION XII.
- OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.
- PART I.
- 116. There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings,
- displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a
- Deity, and refute the fallacies of _Atheists_; and yet the most
- religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded
- as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these
- contradictions? The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the
- world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with
- regard to the existence of these monsters.
- The _Sceptic_ is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the
- indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is
- certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or
- conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any
- subject, either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural
- question; What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push
- these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?
- There is a species of scepticism, _antecedent_ to all study and
- philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a
- sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It
- recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and
- principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they,
- we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some
- original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful.
- But neither is there any such original principle, which has a
- prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if
- there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those
- very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The
- Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any
- human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and
- no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction
- upon any subject.
- It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when
- more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a
- necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper
- impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those
- prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To
- begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and
- sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately
- all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow
- and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we
- can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and
- certainty in our determinations.
- 117. There is another species of scepticism, _consequent_ to science and
- enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute
- fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach
- any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation,
- about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought
- into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of
- common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound
- principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these
- paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in
- some philosophers, and the refutation of them in several, they naturally
- excite our curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which
- they may be founded.
- I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics
- in all ages, against the evidence of _sense_; such as those which are
- derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs, on
- numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the
- various aspects of objects, according to their different distances; the
- double images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other
- appearances of a like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only
- sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are not implicitly to be
- depended on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by
- considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of
- the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them,
- within their sphere, the proper _criteria_ of truth and falsehood. There
- are other more profound arguments against the senses, which admit not of
- so easy a solution.
- 118. It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or
- prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any
- reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an
- external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist,
- though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even
- the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this
- belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.
- It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful
- instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by
- the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any
- suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other.
- This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed
- to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external
- to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it:
- our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform
- and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who
- perceive or contemplate it.
- But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by
- the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be
- present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are
- only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being
- able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the
- object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther
- from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no
- alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present
- to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who
- reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we
- say, _this house_ and _that tree_, are nothing but perceptions in the
- mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which
- remain uniform and independent.
- 119. So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or
- depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system
- with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds
- herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system,
- and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer
- plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: for that led
- us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even
- erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a
- chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of
- argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.
- By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind
- must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though
- resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from
- the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible
- and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us?
- It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not
- from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And
- nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should
- so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a
- substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
- It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be
- produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question
- be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like
- nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind
- has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot
- possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The
- supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in
- reasoning.
- 120. To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in order to
- prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected
- circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our
- senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he
- can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once
- called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we
- may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.
- 121. This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more
- philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to
- introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and
- enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may
- they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to
- believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external
- object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more
- rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of
- something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and
- more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason,
- which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove,
- that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.
- 122. There is another sceptical topic of a like nature, derived from the
- most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were it
- requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and
- reasonings, which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is
- universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities
- of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely
- secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions
- of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they
- represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it
- must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of
- extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that
- denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely acquired
- from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all the qualities,
- perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same
- conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent
- on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can
- save us from this conclusion, but the asserting, that the ideas of those
- primary qualities are attained by _Abstraction_, an opinion, which, if
- we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible, and even
- absurd. An extension, that is neither tangible nor visible, cannot
- possibly be conceived: and a tangible or visible extension, which is
- neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of
- human conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general,
- which is neither _Isosceles_ nor _Scalenum_, nor has any particular
- length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the absurdity
- of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and
- general ideas.[31]
- [31] This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most
- of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best
- lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among
- the ancient or modern philosopher, Bayle not excepted. He
- professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with
- great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as
- well as against the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all
- his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality,
- merely sceptical, appears from this, _that they admit of no
- answer and produce no conviction_. Their only effect is to
- cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion,
- which is the result of scepticism.
- 123. Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or
- to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an
- opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if
- referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same
- time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial
- enquirer. The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion
- as contrary to reason: at least, if it be a principle of reason, that
- all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object. Bereave
- matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary,
- you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown,
- inexplicable _something_, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so
- imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend
- against it.
- PART II.
- 124. It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy
- _reason_ by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the grand scope of
- all their enquiries and disputes. They endeavour to find objections,
- both to our abstract reasonings, and to those which regard matter of
- fact and existence.
- The chief objection against all _abstract_ reasonings is derived from
- the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a
- careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass
- through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief
- object of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of
- absurdity and contradiction. No priestly _dogmas_, invented on purpose
- to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common
- sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of
- extension, with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all
- geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation.
- A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing
- quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on _in infinitum_; this
- is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty for any
- pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the clearest and
- most natural principles of human reason.[32] But what renders the matter
- more extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are
- supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and most natural; nor is
- it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the
- consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all
- the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles; and
- yet, when these are once received, how can we deny, that the angle of
- contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any
- rectilineal angle, that as you may increase the diameter of the circle
- _in infinitum_, this angle of contact becomes still less, even _in
- infinitum_, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their
- tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its
- tangent, and so on, _in infinitum_? The demonstration of these
- principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three
- angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter
- opinion be natural and easy, and the former big with contradiction and
- absurdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and
- suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a
- diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a
- full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders
- upon the most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and
- confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance
- concerning any one object.
- [32] Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points,
- we must allow that there are physical points; that is, parts
- of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by
- the eye or imagination. These images, then, which are present
- to the fancy or senses, are absolutely indivisible, and
- consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely
- less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing appears
- more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them
- composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite
- number of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are
- still supposed infinitely divisible.
- 125. The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences
- seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard to time
- than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in
- succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a
- contradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgement is not
- corrupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be
- able to admit of it.
- Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to
- that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and
- contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances,
- contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is
- absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any
- proposition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more
- sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism
- itself, which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of
- geometry or the science of quantity.[33]
- [33] It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities
- and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no such
- thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but that
- all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to
- a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular
- ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea,
- present to the mind. Thus when the term Horse is pronounced, we
- immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white
- animal, of a particular size or figure: But as that term is
- also usually applied to animals of other colours, figures and
- sizes, these ideas, though not actually present to the imagination,
- are easily recalled; and our reasoning and conclusion proceed
- in the same way, as if they were actually present. If this be
- admitted (as seems reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of
- quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but
- particular, and such as are suggested by the senses and
- imagination, and consequently, cannot be infinitely divisible.
- It is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present, without
- prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers
- of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and
- contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions; and this seems
- the readiest solution of these difficulties.
- 126. The sceptical objections to _moral_ evidence, or to the reasonings
- concerning matter of fact, are either _popular_ or _philosophical_. The
- popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human
- understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained
- in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in
- sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the
- perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and
- sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is needless to
- insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in
- common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and
- cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of
- argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be
- insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of
- _Pyrrhonism_ or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and
- employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may
- flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if
- not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and
- by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and
- sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our
- nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in
- the same condition as other mortals.
- 127. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere,
- and display those _philosophical_ objections, which arise from more
- profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph;
- while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact,
- which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely
- from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of
- this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently
- _conjoined_ together; that we have no argument to convince us, that
- objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will
- likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that
- nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of
- our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like
- other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic
- insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his
- own and our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all
- assurance and conviction. These arguments might be displayed at greater
- length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected
- to result from them.
- 128. For here is the chief and most confounding objection to _excessive_
- scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it
- remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic,
- _What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious
- researches?_ He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer.
- A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of
- astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant
- and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays
- principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on
- conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his
- philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had,
- that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he
- must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life
- must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail.
- All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a
- total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end
- to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very
- little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And
- though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary
- amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most
- trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and
- leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the
- philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned
- themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his
- dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to
- confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no
- other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must
- act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most
- diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of
- these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised
- against them.
- PART III.
- 129. There is, indeed, a more _mitigated_ scepticism or _academical_
- philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in
- part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or _excessive_ scepticism, when
- its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common
- sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to
- be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see
- objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising
- argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to
- which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who
- entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their
- understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They
- are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them
- is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves
- far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy
- of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of
- the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect
- state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a
- reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve,
- and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice
- against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of
- the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are
- commonly still diffident in their determinations: and if any of the
- learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and
- obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by
- showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over
- their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal
- perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In
- general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which,
- in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a
- just reasoner.
- 130. Another species of _mitigated_ scepticism which may be of advantage
- to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts
- and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are
- best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The
- _imagination_ of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is
- remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most
- distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which
- custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct _Judgement_ observes a
- contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines
- itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice
- and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of
- poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring
- us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than
- to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt,
- and of the impossibility, that anything, but the strong power of natural
- instinct, could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to
- philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect,
- that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation,
- philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life,
- methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond
- common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those
- faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate
- operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe,
- after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can
- we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may
- form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature,
- from, and to eternity?
- This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect,
- so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into
- the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their
- objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are the
- proper subjects of science and enquiry.
- 131. It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of
- demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend
- this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere
- sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number
- are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and
- nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a
- variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their
- different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and
- different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost
- scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection,
- pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in
- these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of
- words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That _the square of the
- hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides_, cannot be
- known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of
- reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, _that
- where there is no property, there can be no injustice_, it is only
- necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation
- of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect
- definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical
- reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except
- the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be
- pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.
- 132. All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and
- existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever
- _is_ may _not be_. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction.
- The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and
- distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition, which affirms it not
- to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that
- which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences,
- properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there
- confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the
- half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly
- conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never
- existed, may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable,
- and implies no contradiction.
- The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments
- from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely
- on experience. If we reason _a priori_, anything may appear able to
- produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know,
- extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their
- orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of
- cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object
- from that of another[34]. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning,
- which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of
- all human action and behaviour.
- [34] That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, _Ex nihilo,
- nihil fit_, by which the creation of matter was excluded,
- ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not only the
- will of the supreme Being may create matter; but, for aught we
- know _a priori_, the will of any other being might create it,
- or any other cause, that the most whimsical imagination
- can assign.
- Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All
- deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in
- history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.
- The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural
- philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and
- effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into.
- Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the
- immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning
- particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in
- _reason_, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most
- solid foundation is _faith_ and divine revelation.
- Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as
- of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more
- properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to
- fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of
- mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning
- and enquiry.
- When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc
- must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school
- metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, _Does it contain any abstract
- reasoning concerning quantity or number?_ No. _Does it contain any
- experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?_ No.
- Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry
- and illusion.
- INDEX
- Abstraction
- not source of ideas of primary qualities, 122.
- Academic
- philosophy, 34.
- Action
- and philosophy, 1, 4, 34, 128;
- Addition
- 4.
- Analogy
- a species of, the foundation of all reasoning about matter of fact,
- 82;
- Animals
- the reason of, 83-85;
- learn from experience and draw inferences, 83;
- which can only be founded on custom, 84;
- cause of difference between men and animals, 84 n.
- Antiquity
- 62.
- Appearances
- to senses must be corrected by reason, 117.
- A priori
- 25, 36 n, 89 n, 132, 132 n.
- Aristotle
- 4.
- Association
- of ideas, three principles of, 18-19, 41-44 (v. _Cause_ C).
- Atheism
- 116.
- Bacon
- 99.
- Belief
- (v. _Cause_ C, 39-45);
- and chance, 46.
- Berkeley
- really a sceptic, 122 n.
- Bigotry
- 102.
- Body
- and soul, mystery of union of, 52;
- volition and movements of, 52.
- Real existence of (v. _Scepticism_, B, 118-123).
- Cause
- first (v. _God_, _Necessity_, 78-81; _Providence_,
- 102-115, 132 n).
- a principle of association of ideas, 19, 43;
- sole foundation of reasonings about matter of fact or real existence,
- 22.
- A. _Knowledge of Causes arises from experience not from Reason_,
- 23-33.
- Reasonings _a priori_ give no knowledge of cause and effect,
- 23 f.;
- impossible to see the effect in the cause since they are totally
- different, 25;
- natural philosophy never pretends to assign ultimate causes, but only
- to reduce causes to a few general causes, e.g. gravity, 26;
- geometry applies laws obtained by experience, 27.
- Conclusions from experience not based on any process of the
- understanding, 28;
- yet we infer in the future a similar connexion between known
- qualities of things and their secret powers, to that which
- we assumed in the past. On what is this inference based? 29;
- demonstrative reasoning has no place here, and all experimental
- reasoning assumes the resemblance of the future to the past,
- and so cannot prove it without being circular, 30, 32;
- if reasoning were the basis of this belief, there would be no need
- for the multiplication of instances or of long experience,
- 31;
- yet conclusions about matter of fact are affected by experience even
- in beasts and children, so that they cannot be founded on
- abstruse reasoning, 33;
- to explain our inferences from experience a principle is required of
- equal weight and authority with reason, 34.
- B. _Custom enables us to infer existence of one object from the
- appearance of another_, 35-38.
- Experience enables us to ascribe a more than arbitrary connexion to
- objects, 35;
- we are determined to this by custom or habit which is the great guide
- of human life, 36;
- but our inference must be based on some fact present to the senses
- or memory, 37;
- the customary conjunction between such an object and some other
- object produces an operation of the soul which is as
- unavoidable as love, 38;
- animals also infer one event from another by custom, 82-84;
- and in man as in animals experimental reasoning depends on a species
- of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to
- ourselves, 85.
- C. _Belief_, 39-45.
- Belief differs from fiction or the loose reveries of the fancy by
- some feeling annexed to it, 39;
- belief cannot be defined, but may be described as a more lively,
- forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than can be
- attained by the imagination alone, 40;
- it is produced by the principles of association, viz. resemblance,
- 41;
- contiguity, 42;
- causation, 43;
- by a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature
- and our ideas, 44;
- this operation of our minds necessary to our subsistence and so
- entrusted by nature to instinct rather than to reasoning, 45.
- _Probability_, 46-7.
- Belief produced by a majority of chances by an inexplicable
- contrivance of Nature, 46 (cf. 87-8);
- probability of causes: the failure of a cause ascribed to a secret
- counteracting cause, 47 (cf. 67);
- it is universally allowed that chance when strictly examined is a
- mere negative word, 74.
- D. _Power_, 49-57.
- Power, force, energy, necessary connexion must either be defined by
- analysis or explained by production of the impression from
- which they are copied, 49;
- from the first appearance of an object we cannot foretell its effect:
- we cannot see the power of a single body: we only see
- sequence, 50.
- Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an
- idea of reflection? 51;
- it is not derived, as Locke said, from reasoning about power of
- production in nature, 50 n;
- nor from consciousness of influence of will over bodily organs, 52;
- nor from effort to overcome resistance, 52 n (cf. 60 n);
- nor from influence of will over mind, 53;
- many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle, to a
- volition of the supreme being, and regard causes as only
- occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations, 54-5;
- thus diminishing the grandeur of God, 56;
- this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties, and
- is no explanation, 57;
- vis inertiae, 57 n.
- In single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are
- conjoined and never connected, 58;
- the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar
- instances, and the only difference between such a number and
- a single instance is that the former produces a habit of
- expecting the usual attendant, 59, 61.
- This customary transition is the impression from which we form the
- idea of necessary connexion.
- E. _Reasoning from effect to cause and conversely_, 105-115 (v.
- _Providence_).
- In arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in
- the cause than are required to produce the effect, nor reason
- backwards from an inferred cause to new effects, 105-8;
- we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human
- acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge, 111-2;
- when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any
- species we cannot infer its cause at all, 115.
- F. _Definitions of Cause_, 60 (cf. 74 n).
- Ceremonies
- 41.
- Chance
- ignorance of causes, 46;
- has no existence, 74 (v. _Cause_ B).
- Cicero
- 4.
- Circle
- in reasoning, 30.
- Clarke
- 37 n.
- Colour
- peculiarity of ideas of, 16.
- Contiguity
- 19, 42.
- Contradiction
- the test of demonstration, 132.
- Contrariety
- 19 n.
- Contrary
- of matter of fact always possible, 21, 132.
- Creation
- 132 n.
- Criticism
- 132.
- Cudworth
- 57 n, 158 n.
- Custom
- when strongest conceals itself, 24;
- an ultimate principle of all conclusions from experience, 36, 127;
- and belief, 39-45;
- gives rise to inferences of animals, 84.
- Definition
- only applicable to complex ideas, 49;
- need of, 131;
- of cause, 60.
- Demonstrative
- opp. intuitive, 20;
- reasoning, 30;
- confined to quantity and number, 131;
- impossible to demonstrate a fact since no negation of a fact can
- involve a contradiction, 132.
- Descartes
- 57 n.;
- his universal doubt antecedent to study if strictly taken is
- incurable, since even from an indubitable first principle no
- advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt,
- 116;
- his appeal to the veracity of God is useless, 120 (v. _Scepticism_,
- 116-132).
- Design
- argument from, 105 f. (v. _Providence_).
- Divisibility
- of mathematical and physical points, 124.
- Doubt
- Cartesian, 116, 120 (v. _Scepticism_ A).
- Epictetus
- 34.
- Epicurean
- philosophy, defence of, 102-15;
- denial of providence and future state is harmless, 104 (v.
- _Providence_).
- Euclid
- truths in, do not depend on existence of circles or triangles, 20.
- Evidence
- moral and natural, 70;
- value of human, 82-9 (v. _Miracles_).
- Evil
- doctrine of necessity either makes God the cause of evil or denies
- existence of evil as regards the whole, 78-81.
- Existence
- external and perception, 118-9 (v. _Scepticism_, B, 116-32).
- Ex nihilo nihil
- 132 n.
- Experience
- (v. _Cause_ A, 23-33);
- opposition of reason and experience usual, but really erroneous and
- superficial, 36 n.
- Infallible, may be regarded as proof, 87 (v. _Miracles_);
- all the philosophy and religion in the world cannot carry us beyond
- the usual course of experience, 113.
- Extension
- 50;
- a supposed primary quality, 122.
- Faith
- 101, 132.
- Fiction
- and fact (v. _Cause_ C), 39 f.
- Future
- inference to, from past, 29 (v. _Cause_ A).
- General
- ideas, do not really exist, but only particular ideas attached to a
- general term, 125 n.
- Geography
- mental, 8.
- Geometry
- propositions of certain, as depending only on relations of ideas not
- on existence of objects, 20;
- gives no knowledge of ultimate causes: only applies laws discovered
- by experience, 27.
- God
- idea of, 14;
- no idea of except what we learn from reflection on our own
- faculties, 57;
- theory that God is cause of all motion and thought, causes being
- only occasions of his volition, 54-57;
- by doctrine of necessity either there are no bad actions or God is
- the cause of evil, 78-81.
- Veracity of, appealed to, 120.
- And creation of matter, 132 n.
- v. _Providence_, 102-115; _Scepticism_, 116-132.
- Golden
- age, 107.
- Gravity
- 26.
- Habit
- (v. _Custom_, _Cause_ B).
- History
- use of, 65.
- Human
- nature, inconstancy a constant character of, 68.
- Ideas
- A. _Origin of_, 11-17.
- Perceptions divided into impressions and ideas, 11-12;
- the mind can only compound the materials derived from outward or
- inward sentiment, 13 (cf. 53);
- all ideas resolvable into simple ideas copied from precedent
- feelings, 14;
- deficiency in an organ of sensation produces deficiency in
- corresponding idea, 15-16;
- suspected ideas to be tested by asking for the impression from
- which it is derived, 17 (cf. 49);
- idea of reflection, 51;
- general ideas, 135 n;
- innate ideas, 19 n;
- power of will over ideas, 53.
- B. _Association of_, 18-19.
- Ideas introduce each other with a certain degree of method and
- regularity, 18;
- only three principles of association, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity,
- and Cause or Effect, 19;
- contrariety, 19 n;
- production of belief by these principles, 41-43.
- C. Correspondence of ideas and course of nature, 44;
- relations of ideas one of two possible objects of enquiry, 20;
- such relations discoverable by the mere operation of thought, 20,
- 131;
- no demonstration possible except in case of ideas of quantity or
- number, 131.
- Imagination
- 11, 39;
- and belief, 40.
- Impressions
- all our more lively perceptions, 12;
- the test of ideas, 17, 49.
- Incest
- peculiar turpitude of explained, 12.
- Inconceivability
- of the negative, 132 (cf. 20).
- Inertia
- 57 n.
- Inference
- and similarity, 30, 115 (v. _Cause_).
- Infinite
- divisibility, 124 f.
- Instances
- multiplication of not required by reason, 31.
- Instinct
- more trustworthy than reasoning, 45;
- the basis of all experimental reasoning, 85;
- the basis of realism, 118, 121.
- Intuitive
- opp. mediate reasoning, 2.
- La Bruyere
- 4.
- Liberty
- (v. _Necessity_, 62-97).
- Definition of hypothetical liberty, 73.
- Necessary to morality, 77.
- Locke
- 4, 40 n, 50 n, 57 n.
- His loose use of 'ideas,' 19 n;
- betrayed into frivolous disputes about innate ideas by the
- School-men, 19 n;
- distinction of primary and secondary qualities, 122.
- Malebranche
- 4, 57 n..
- Man
- a reasonable and active being, 4.
- Marriage
- rules of, based on and vary with utility, 118.
- Mathematics
- ideas of, clear and determinate, hence their superiority to moral
- and metaphysical sciences, 48;
- their difficulty, 48.
- Mathematical and physical points, 124 n.
- Matter
- necessity of, 64;
- creation of, 132 n (v. _Scepticism_ A).
- Matter-of-fact
- contrary of, always possible, 21;
- arguments to new, based only on cause and effect, 22.
- Metaphysics
- not a science, 5-6;
- how inferior and superior to mathematics, 48.
- Mind
- mental geography, 8;
- secret springs and principles of, 9;
- can only mix and compound materials given by inward and outward
- sentiment, 13;
- power of will over, 53.
- Miracles.
- 86-101.
- Belief in human evidence diminishes according as the event witnessed
- is unusual or extraordinary, 89;
- difference between extraordinary and miraculous, 89 n;
- if the evidence for a miracle amounted to proof we should have one
- proof opposed by another proof, for the proof against a
- miracle is as complete as possible;
- an event is not miraculous unless there is a uniform experience,
- that is a proof, against it, 90;
- definition of miracle, 90 n;
- hence no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless its
- falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it
- establishes, 91;
- as a fact the evidence for a miracle has never amounted to proof, 92;
- the passion for the wonderful in human nature, 93;
- prevalence of miracles in savage and early periods and their
- diminution with civilization, 94;
- the evidence for miracles in matters of religion opposed by the
- almost infinite number of witnesses for rival religions, 95;
- value of human testimony diminished by temptation to pose as a
- prophet or apostle, 97;
- no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much
- less to a proof, and if it did amount to a proof it would be
- opposed by another perfect proof, 98;
- so a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a
- system of religion, 99;
- a conclusion which confounds those who base the Christian religion
- on reason, not on faith, 100;
- the Christian religion cannot be believed without a miracle which
- will subvert the principle of a man's understanding and give
- him a determination to believe what is most contrary to
- custom and experience, 101.
- Moral
- evil (q.v.) 80.
- Moral science
- 30;
- inferior to mathematics, 48;
- sceptical objections to, 126-7.
- Moral evidence easily combined with natural, 70.
- Motion
- 50.
- Nature
- design in, 105 f. (v. _Providence_),
- and the course of our ideas, 44.
- State of, a philosophical fiction, 151, 151 n.
- Necessary
- connexion (v. _Cause_).
- Necessity
- two definitions of, 75.
- A. _and Liberty_, 62-81;
- the controversy is based on ambiguity, and all mankind have always
- been of the same opinion on this subject, 63;
- our idea of the necessity of matter arises solely from observed
- uniformity and consequent inference, circumstances which are
- allowed by all men to exist in respect of human action, 64;
- history and knowledge of human nature assume such uniformity, 65,
- which does not exclude variety due to education and progress, 66;
- irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary
- causes, 67;
- the inconstancy of human action, its constant character, as of winds
- and weather, 68;
- we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction
- of motives and actions, 69;
- history, politics, and morals show this, and the possibility of
- combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a
- common origin, 70;
- the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a
- lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere
- conjunction, 71;
- we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of
- brute matter, 72;
- the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of
- liberty and a false experiment, 72 n;
- though this question is the most contentious of all, mankind has
- always agreed in the doctrine of liberty, if we mean by it
- that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of
- acting or not acting according to the determinations of our
- will, and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a
- prisoner, 73;
- liberty when opposed to necessity, and not merely to constraint, is
- the same as chance, 74.
- B. _Both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality_, this
- doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so
- is at least innocent, 75;
- rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives, and
- connexion of character and action: if necessity be denied,
- a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it, 76;
- liberty also essential to morality, 77.
- Objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of
- causes either makes God the cause of evil, or abolishes evil
- in actions, 78;
- Stoic answer, that the whole system is good, is specious but
- ineffectual in practice, 79;
- no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural
- sentiments to blame certain actions, 80;
- how God can be the cause of all actions without being the author of
- moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal,
- 81.
- Negative
- inconceivability of, 132.
- Newton
- 57 n.
- Nisus
- 52 n, 60 n.
- Number
- the object of demonstration, 131.
- Occasional causes
- theory of, 55.
- Parallelism
- between thought and course of nature, 44-5.
- Perception
- and external objects, 119 f. (v. _Scepticism_, _Impression_,
- _Idea_).
- Philosophy
- moral, two branches of, abstruse and practical, 1-5;
- gratifies innocent curiosity, 6;
- metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human
- understanding, 6.
- True, must lay down limits of understanding, 7 (cf. 113);
- a large part of, consists in mental geography, 8;
- may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general
- principles, 9.
- Natural, only staves off our ignorance a little longer, as moral or
- metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger
- portions of it, 26;
- academical, or sceptical, flatters no bias or passion except love of
- truth, and so has few partisans, 34;
- though it destroy speculation, cannot destroy action, for nature
- steps in and asserts her rights, 34;
- moral, inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas, superior in
- shortness of arguments, 48.
- Controversies in, due to ambiguity of terms, 62.
- Disputes in, not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a
- doctrine, 75.
- Speculative, entirely indifferent to the peace of society and
- security of government, 104 (cf. 114).
- All the philosophy in the world, and all the religion in the world,
- which is nothing but a species of philosophy, can never
- carry us beyond the usual course of experience, 113.
- Happiness of, to have originated in an age and country of freedom
- and toleration, 102.
- Points
- physical, indivisible, 124 n.
- Power
- 50 f, 60 n. (v. _Cause_ D).
- Probability
- 46 f. (v. _Cause_, B).
- Probable
- arguments, 38, 46 n.
- Production
- 50 n.
- Promises
- not the foundation of justice, 257.
- Proof
- 46 n, 86-101 (v. _Miracles_, _Demonstrative_).
- Providence
- 102-115 (v. _God_).
- The sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design
- in nature; must not infer greater power in the cause than is
- necessary to produce the observed effects, nor argue from
- such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not
- been observed, 105;
- so must not infer in God more power, wisdom, and benevolence than
- appears in nature, 106;
- so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the Gods by
- assuming the intractability of matter or the observance of
- general laws, 107;
- to argue from effects to unknown causes, and then from these causes
- to unknown effects, is a gross sophism, 108.
- From imperfect exercise of justice in this world we cannot infer its
- perfect exercise in a future world, 109;
- we must regulate our conduct solely by the experienced train of
- events, 110;
- in case of human works of art we can infer the perfect from the
- imperfect, but that is because we know man by experience and
- also know other instances of his art, 111-112;
- but in the case of God we only know him by his productions, and do
- not know any class of beings to which he belongs, 113;
- and the universe, his production, is entirely singular and does not
- belong to a known species of things, 115.
- Punishment
- requires doctrines of necessity and liberty, 76 (v. _Necessity_).
- Pyrrhonism
- 126.
- Qualities
- primary and secondary, 122.
- Quantity
- and number, the only objects of demonstration, the parts of them
- being entirely similar, 131.
- Real
- presence, 86.
- Reality
- and thought, 44.
- Realism
- of the vulgar, 118.
- Reason
- (a) opp. intuition, 29;
- opp. experience, 28, 36 n.
- (b) Corrects sympathy and senses, 117.
- No match for nature, 34.
- Fallacious, compared with instinct, 45.
- Of men and animals, 84 n.
- (c) attempts to destroy, by reasoning, 124;
- objections to abstract reasoning, 124 f. (v. _Scepticism_).
- (d) _Reasoning_.
- Two kinds of, demonstrative and moral, 30, 46 n, 132;
- moral, divided into general and particular, 132;
- produces demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities, 46 n.
- Probable (v. _Cause_, 28-32).
- Relations
- of ideas, discoverable by the mere operation of thought,
- independently of the existence of any object, 20.
- Religion
- a kind of philosophy, 113 (v. _Miracles, Providence_).
- Resemblance
- 19, 41 (v. _Similarity_).
- Resistance
- and idea of power, 53 n.
- Scepticism
- A. antecedent to study and philosophy, such as Descartes' universal
- doubt of our faculties, would be incurable: in a more
- moderate sense it is useful, 116 (cf. 129-30);
- extravagant attempts of, to destroy reason by reasoning, 124.
- No such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything
- at all, 116;
- admits of no answer and produces no conviction, 122 n. (cf. 34, 126,
- 128).
- B. _As to the Senses_, 117-123.
- The ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be
- corrected by Reason, 117;
- more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external
- objects is baseless, and that the objects we see are nothing
- but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other
- existences, 118;
- even this philosophy is hard to justify; it appeals neither to
- natural instinct, nor to experience, for experience tells
- nothing of objects which perceptions resemble, 119;
- the appeal to the _veracity of God_ is useless, 120;
- and scepticism is here triumphant, 121.
- _The distinction between primary and secondary qualities_ is useless,
- for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions, 122;
- and Berkeley's theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by
- abstraction is impossible, 122, 122 n;
- if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there
- is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth
- arguing about, 123.
- C. _As to Reason_, 124-130.
- Attempt to destroy Reason by reasoning extravagant, 124;
- objection to _abstract reasoning_ because it asserts infinite
- divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense,
- 124,
- and infinite divisibility of time, 125;
- yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism
- becomes sceptical about itself, 125.
- Popular objections to _moral reasoning_ about matter of fact, based
- on weakness of understanding, variation of judgement, and
- disagreement among men, confuted by action, 126;
- philosophical objections, that we only experience conjunction and
- that inference is based on custom, 127;
- excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by
- the most trivial event in life, 128.
- Mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective
- and as producing caution and modesty, 129;
- and as limiting understanding to proper objects, 130;
- all reasoning which is not either abstract, about quantity and
- number, or experimental, about matters of fact, is sophistry
- and illusion, 132.
- D. In _Religion_ (v. _Miracles_, _Providence_).
- Sciences
- 132 (v. _Reason_, (d); _Scepticism_, C).
- Secret
- powers, 39;
- counteracting causes, 47, 67.
- Senses
- outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of
- thinking--must be corrected by reason, 117.
- Scepticism concerning, 117 (v. _Scepticism_, B).
- Similarity
- basis of all arguments from experience, 31 (cf. 115).
- Solidity
- 50;
- a supposed primary quality, 122.
- Soul
- and body, 52.
- Space
- and time, 124 f.
- Species
- an effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference
- to its cause, 115 (cf. 113).
- Stoics
- 34, 79.
- Superstition
- 6 (v. _Providence_).
- Theology
- science of, 132 (v. _God_, _Providence_).
- Tillotson
- argument against real presence, 86.
- Time
- and space, 124 f.
- Truth
- 8, 17 (v. _Scepticism_).
- Understanding
- limits of human, 7;
- operations of, to be classified, 8;
- opp. experience, 28;
- weakness of, 126 (v. _Reason_, _Scepticism_).
- Voluntariness
- as ground of distinction between virtues and talents, 130.
- Whole
- theory that everything is good as regards 'the whole,' 79, 80.
- Will
- compounds materials given by senses, 13;
- influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of
- power; for we are not conscious of any power in our will,
- only of sequence of motions on will, 52;
- so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas, 53.
- Of God, cannot be used to explain motion, 57.
- Freedom of (v. _Necessity_).
- End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Enquiry Concerning Human
- Understanding, by David Hume and L. A. Selby-Bigge
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